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The preeminent feature of the post-Suharto Indonesian state is its extensive and 
intensive regional violence. Few observers have been surprised by the locations in 
which the worst of this violence has erupted. Three of these were home to long­
standing rebellions against Indonesian rule. Aceh, the last territory subdued by the 
Dutch and home to a long-term, albeit low-intensity, independence movement, is now 
site of daily arson attacks and armed clashes between the Indonesian military and the 
Free Aceh Movement. East Timor, brutally invaded and annexed by Indonesia in 1975, 
was the site of massive violence both before and after the August 1999 referendum, 
through which it achieved independence. Irian Jaya, invaded by the Indonesian military 
in 1962 and integrated into the republic via a sham UN-sponsored "act of free choice" 
in 1969, is now experiencing ceremonial raisings of the independence movement's 
Morning Star flag, demonstrations, and riots. Although the Maluku islands' history of 
separatism pre-dating the Suharto era differs from the histories of the other territories 
noted here, the Maluku islands have also been rocked by serious inter-ethnic/religious 
violence that has left thousands dead and many more displaced. In each of these 
regions political violence erupted where local aspirations for independence have been 
quashed by the harsh combination of military rule and economic developmentalism.
1 We would like to thank Benedict Anderson and John Sidel for providing superb comments on a draft of 
this article.
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A fifth major site of regional violence is West Kalimantan, where widespread 
violence erupted well before Suharto's resignation and has continued on and off for 
more than four years. Calling the 1997 episode "one of the worst outbreaks of 
communal violence in Indonesia in decades," Human Rights Watch/Asia reported that 
"Dayaks waged what appeared to be a ritual war against Madurese communities, 
burning houses, killing inhabitants, and in some cases severing heads and eating the 
livers of those killed."2 The violence was eventually brought under control in March 
1997, but not until it had left a toll of hundreds dead and a legacy of bitter hatred.3 
Between February and May 1999, renewed fighting broke out between Malays and 
Dayaks, on the one hand, and Madurese, on the other. Unlike the 1997 incident, the 
1999 violence resulted in some fifty thousand Madurese fleeing Sambas district; 
roughly thirty thousand of these refugees are still housed in "temporary" camps in 
Pontianak and outside Singkawang.
Headlines in the international press portrayed the violence in West Kalimantan in 
alarming terms: "Descent into darkest Borneo"; "Cannibal warriors feast on bodies of 
their victims"; and "Refugees in terror of die head-hunters."4 The explanations offered 
for the violence are no more useful than the sensational headlines. The Economist 
adopts a "cultural" explanation, reporting that Dayaks and Malays have "revived" 
their "long-standing tradition" of "smear[ing] themselves with blood and carry[ing] 
trophies cut from the bodies of their victims." The Independent attributes the brutalities 
to "land disputes and cultural differences." The Observer explains that the recent 
atrocities committed by the "head-hunters" are a result of "Indonesia's experiment in 
population control." Conspicuously absent from these (and most) accounts is any 
serious consideration of either history or politics.
Although the ongoing conflict in West Kalimantan does not involve separatist 
aspirations, the violence can only be understood in terms of the province's own history 
of rebellion. Indeed, if East Timor was home to Indonesia's (once) "forgotten war" and 
Irian Jaya home to Indonesia's "secret war," then West Kalimantan was home to the 
New Order's first and (still) least known war.5 The details read as follows: in 1966 
armed insurgency broke out in the heavily forested stretch of West Kalimantan 
between the Malaysian border and the Kapuas river; ten years later, the Indonesian 
Armed Forces (ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) declared an end to 
military operations. Between these dates lies a virtually unknown but brutal history of 
military operations, ethnic engineering, environmental degradation, capital 
accumulation, and coercive state-building. And it is here in the "jungles" of Borneo 
among the "Dayak warriors" that the founding sins of the New Order have returned to 
haunt the same state's collapse into disorder.
2 Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Indonesia: Communal Violence in West Kalimantan," Human Rights 
Watch/Asia 9,10 (December 1997): 3.
3 See the set of media reports on the 1997 violence in Sisi Gelap Kalimantan Barat: Perseteruan Etnis Dayak- 
Madura 1997 (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi and Institute Dayakology Research and Development, 
1999).
4 The Economist, March 27-April 2,1999; The Independent, March 22,1999; and The Observer, March 28, 
1999.
5 John Taylor, Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1991), and 
Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985).
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This article explores the ten-year history of the so-called "PGRS/Paraku" 
(Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak, Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force/Pasukan Rakyat 
Kalimantan Utara, North Kalimantan People's Force) rebellion in West Kalimantan. It 
does so along two related lines, the first concerning rebellion and military operations, 
the second dealing with the official handling of refugees and ethnic relations in West 
Kalimantan. In so doing, we highlight a series of issues—military operations, racist 
treatment of the ethnic Chinese population, state-building, the rise of local capital, 
large-scale logging, and transmigration—each of which has been treated individually by 
scholars of Indonesia, but which have generally not been studied in relation to one 
another. Although a full history of social conflict in West Kalimantan remains to be 
written, we believe that the lineages of the current violence in West Kalimantan are to 
be found in the unknown rebellion and war that lasted from 1966 until 1976. A 
considered account of this rebellion is also necessary for any comparative study of 
regional resistance to Suharto's rule.
I. From Konfrontasi to Insurgency
The origins of rebellion in West Kalimantan lie in the creation of the Malaysian 
state comprising the former British territories of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and 
North Borneo (Sabah). While peninsular Malaya and Singapore posed few real 
problems for either the outgoing British or the Malay and Chinese elites to whom 
power was to be handed, the territories in northern Borneo were moderately more 
troublesome. In Sarawak the British faced a local left that had survived the so-called 
"Emergency" and the collapse of the Malayan Races Liberation Army during the late 
1950s in Malaya.6 The situation was further complicated by the presence of the 
British-held, anachronistic sultanate of Brunei, with rights to vast oil reserves on the 
swampy coast of the South China Sea. Although it won the August 1962 election, the 
Party Ra'ayat found itself outnumbered in the National Legislative Council by 
delegates appointed directly by the Sultan. In December, Party Ra'ayat head Sheikh A. 
M. Azahari launched a rebellion that aimed to unite an independent North Kalimantan 
(Kalimantan Utara).7 Sukarno declared support for the rebellion, but British forces 
were quickly flown in to rescue the Sultan and crush the uprising.8
The British and the new Malaysian political elite also faced Indonesian opposition 
to the formation of Malaysia. In January 1963, Indonesia initiated a vague policy of 
Confrontation (Konfrontasi), to be waged along political, economic, and military 
fronts, against what President Sukarno perceived to be Britain's neocolonial Malaysia 
plan. Despite promising talks between Sukarno and Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku
6 See Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (London: MacMillan 
Education Ltd., 1982), pp. 257-259.
7 The full extent of Azahari's role in the revolt is unclear. At the time of the revolt's outbreak, Azahari was 
in Manila preparing a trip to the United Nations in New York to plead his case for North Kalimantan.
8 On the Brunei Revolt, see J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute, 1963-1966 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 112-122; and Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small, The 
Undeclared War: The Story of the Indonesian Confrontation 1962-1966 (London: Leo Cooper, 1971). For a 
decidedly anti-British analysis, see Greg Poulgrain, The Genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, 
1945-1965 (Bathhurst, Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 1998).
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Abdul Rahman, Britain proceeded with its Malaysia plan. This development infuriated 
Sukarno, and when Malaysia was officially proclaimed on September 16, 1963, 
Indonesia refused to recognize it. The Tunku responded by severing diplomatic 
relations with Indonesia. A day later, anti-British demonstrations rocked Jakarta, 
culminating in the destruction of the British embassy and the looting of dozens of 
British homes throughout the capital. The Crush Malaysia (Ganjang Malaysia) 
campaign was now in full force.
The military coordination of Konfrontasi was placed under the Mandala Alert 
Command (Komando Siaga Mandala, abbreviated Kolaga) and the Inter-Regional 
Military Commands (Komando Antar Daerah, abbreviated Koanda), with Sumatra 
and Kalimantan each having its own combat forces and operations names. The 
Kalimantan operation was named Mandau and its combat force was Kopur Siaga HI, 
comprised of army brigades from the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) and 
the Java-based regional military commands.9 Under the Ganjang Malaysia campaign, 
raids into Sarawak increased in frequency, as did the number of troops involved.10 But 
these raids failed to establish reliable base camps within Sarawak and failed to arouse 
popular resistance among Sarawak's inhabitants against the Malaysian Plan. It is 
widely believed that the Indonesian military was reluctant to carry out a full-scale 
attack against the experienced and well-equipped British forces (which included 
Gurkas).
Domestically, Konfrontasi received enthusiastic support from the Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), which argued that civilians should 
be trained and armed to participate in the campaign. In the context of the fierce rivalry 
between the PKI and the army, this was seen as a means of arming a "fifth force" 
outside of the military. In early 1963, Army Chief of Staff General Nasution stated 
that if revolutionary youths {pemuda pejuang) from "North Kalimantan" (i.e. Sarawak) 
asked for help in their struggle for freedom that Indonesia would willingly provide it.11 
Over the course of the next year Indonesia provided basic military training and 
weapons to several thousand volunteers (sukarelawan) in West Kalimantan and on 
Java. These sukarelawan were of mixed origins, including followers of Azahari's Brunei 
uprising (TNKU, Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara, subsequently Paraku),12 young 
ethnic Chinese supporters of the Sarawak Communist Party (the armed wing of which
9 In Sumatra, the combat force was called Komando Tempur Siaga II and the operation named Rentjong. 
Although information about the units deployed in Kalimantan during Konfrontasi remains limited, these 
included: Divisi Tempur IV/Kostrad, Satuan Tempur "A," Brigade V, Infantry Battalion 305 (Regiment 10, 
Garut), Infantry Battalion 503 (Brigade 17, Jombang), and West Kalimantan-based Infantry Battalions 600 
(Raiders), 602, and 603.
10 The first armed military engagement of Konfrontasi occurred on April 12,1963, involving an estimated 
thirty Indonesian raiders crossing the West Kalimantan border into Sarawak. Mackie contends that, by 
creating an "external threat," these raids ironically made the incorporation of Sarawak smoother than 
anticipated. Mackie, Konfrontasi, pp. 61-62.
11 Nasution visited West Kalimantan in July 1963 to inspect the volunteers sent to participate in 
Konfrontasi. Cited in Machrus Effendy, Penghancuran PGRS-Paraku dan PKI di Kalimantan Barat (Jakarta: 
PT Dian Kemilau, 1995), p. 22.
12 General Soemadi, Peranan Kalimantan Barat dalam menghadapi Subversi Komunis Asia Tenggara 
(Pontianak: Yayasan Tanjungpura, 1974), pp. 53-54. Hereafter abbreviated PKB. The name Paraku is a 
derivation of Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (North Kalimantan People's Force).
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was the PGRS),13 Indonesian "volunteers" recruited in West Kalimantan and West 
Java (many of whom were sympathetic to the Indonesian Communist Party),14 and 
Indonesian military troops "who had been released from their army units."15 While the 
sukarelawan did participate in dozens of cross-border raids into Sarawak, on the whole 
they only played a minor role in the sporadic fighting between 1963 and 1965.
The military takeover on October 1, 1965 and resulting military seizure of power 
created a political reversal with extraordinary implications throughout Indonesia. The 
Suharto-led military instigated massive anti-communist massacres that lasted well into 
1966 and subsequently banned the PKI. The new regime's virulent anti-communism 
was quickly felt in West Kalimantan. On October 16, the West Kalimantan provincial 
government placed a "freeze" on the PKI and its affiliated organizations and ordered 
party leaders to report to the authorities. Two days later there were violent anti-PKI 
demonstrations in Pontianak. Despite calls for the arrest of PKI leaders, Brig. Gen. 
Ryacudu, the commander of the Tanjungpura Regional Military Command (Kodam 
XII), was unwilling to arrest Said Achmad Sofyan, head of the West Kalimantan PKI, 
and in fact gave him refuge in Ryacudu's official residence.16
Back in Jakarta, General Suharto moved swiftly to end Konfrontasi. In fact, the 
initial step had been taken prior to the October 1 seizure of power, when Lt. Col. Ali 
Moertopo and Lt. Col. L. B. Moerdani (then the Indonesian military attach^ in Kuala 
Lumpur) initiated secret negotiations with their Malaysian and British counterparts.17 
In January 1966, the Indonesian and Malaysian Foreign Ministers met in Bangkok to 
negotiate an end to Konfrontasi; further talks followed in Kuala Lumpur in May.18 
With the prospect of the resumption of foreign aid and Suharto's increasing dominance 
of the nation's political scene, the Jakarta Accord was signed on August 11, 1966, 
bringing Konfrontasi to a close.19 The Indonesian-Malaysian talks had tentatively 
directed the "volunteers" in West Kalimantan to return their weapons and disband,
13 Estimates vary widely. Van der Kroef reports that by 1964 "more than one thousand Sarawak Chinese ... 
had crossed into Indonesia to receive guerrilla training." Justus M. Van der Kroef, "The Sarawak- 
Indonesian Border Insurgency," Modem Asian Studies, Vol. 2, Part 3, July 1968, p. 250. Mackie reports 
between one thousand and two thousand did so. Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 215. Soemadi provides conflicting 
figures, although the most detailed is a claim of 739 Chinese from Sarawak and 99 "non-Communist 
Indonesian volunteers," based on the amusing logic that the 99 who later returned their weapons to the 
Indonesian military must be good Indonesians while the 739 who refused were bad Chinese from across the 
border. See Soemadi, PKB, pp. 55-57.
14 See Franklin B. Weinstein, Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry Into the Functions of Indonesian 
Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1969), pp. 4-5,42.
15 Mackie, Konfrontasi, p. 211.
16 According to a number of well-placed sources, two weeks later Sofyan was escorted outside of 
Pontianak and released.
17 Julius Pour, Benny Moerdani: Profit Prajurit Negarawan (Jakarta: Yayasan Kejuangan Panglima Besar 
Sudirman, 1993), pp. 314-343.
18 Curiously, in February 1966 the old Komando Operasi Tertinggi (Koti, High Operational Command) was 
replaced by a new Komando Ganjang Malaysia (Kogam, Crush Malaysia Command). While the new name 
suggested heightened hostility toward Malaysia, the opposite was the case. See Harsja W. Bachtiar, Siapa 
Dia? Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD) (Jakarta: Penerbit E)jambatan, 
1988), p. 23.
19 This paragraph is largely based on Weinstein, Indonesia Abandons Confrontation, pp. 54-88. The quote is 
found on page 76. Diplomatic relations with Malaysia were not restored for more than a year.
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but many of these volunteers, having been mobilized to participate in armed resistance, 
disregarded the directive.
In sum, rebellion in West Kalimantan can be traced to four distinct groups: Paraku, 
PGRS, Indonesian "volunteers," and the recently banned West Kalimantan branch of 
the PKI. With the end of Konfrontasi, however, these actors coalesced into two more or 
less distinct groups. On the one hand, the PGRS and Paraku fused, coming to be 
known as PGRS/Paraku, with the former concentrated along the western part of the 
West Kalimantan-Sarawak border and the latter located along the border's eastern 
reaches. On the other hand, members of the banned PKI and some former Indonesian 
volunteers joined forces, first as an urban underground and later in the mountain 
complexes of West Kalimantan. Fighting for Sarawak's independence, the 
PGRS/Paraku was oriented towards Malaysia (although survival necessitated 
engaging the Indonesian military as well), while the PKI was oriented towards West 
Kalimantan. The origins of rebellion in Borneo therefore can be traced to the curious 
combination of anti-Sultanism in Brunei, Indonesian and Sarawakian opposition to the 
formation of Malaysia, and the Indonesian military's 1965-1966 pogroms against the 
PKI.
In spite of these varied origins and the clear distinction between the PGRS/Paraku 
and the PKI, Jakarta and its western allies—influenced by the climate of virulent anti­
communism—viewed armed resistance on Borneo as a single movement closely allied 
with the People's Republic of China (PRC), which had designs on Southeast Asia; the 
region was soon labeled "Southeast Asia's Second Front."20 While such a view clearly 
disregards the origins and dynamics of rebellion, in fact, accusations that 
"international" support had been extended to the rebels along the West Kalimantan- 
Sarawak border were not entirely unfounded. In addition to the groups mentioned 
above, there was a possible additional player: agents sent by the PRC to aid the rebels. 
The New Order military mistook these agents for PRC nationals, when in fact they 
were Sarawak-born Communists who in June 1962 had been deported to China by the 
British. Whether they actually were PRC agents, information about the presence of 
"PRC nationals" sent by Beijing clearly shaped Jakarta's (and perhaps also Western) 
perceptions of the international dimensions of the rebellions.21
II. Military and Rebel Organizing, 1966-1967
Having signed the Jakarta Accord in August 1966, New Order officials in Jakarta 
began to address the problem of "rebels" in West Kalimantan. But without a change in 
the command structure in Kalimantan, military operations continued to be conducted 
by the old Kolaga and Kopur commands, which, originally established to spearhead 
Konfrontasi, were unlikely to hunt down their former collaborators. Despite the 
introduction of Operation Order (Operasi Tertib) in October 1966, little real military
20 See Arnold C. Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).
2* In early 1963, these "agents"— Bong Kee Chok and Wen Ming Chuyan—arrived in Indonesia and 
received basic military training from the Indonesian army. See Bong Kee Chok's interview, "From the jungle 
to the conference table," Far Eastern Economic Review (April 4,1975): 26-27. We are grateful to Michael 
Leigh for clarifying this point. For their mistaken nationalities, see Soemadi, PKB, pp. 53-54.
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activity took place during the following months. This was in part a result of the 
Suharto regime's preoccupation with destroying the PKI in Java and Bali, in part too a 
result of misjudgment about the nature of the problem in West Kalimantan. In the 
words of a veteran of these operations, military officers in West Kalimantan wished 
that the "problem" would simply disappear.22
The military also introduced new policies regarding the Chinese population in West 
Kalimantan. In April 1966, authorities began to compile lists of personnel in all 
Chinese organizations, schools, and related institutions. In December 1966, authorities 
banned the Chinese organization Baperki, and the commander of the Tanjungpura 
Regional Military Command, Brig. Gen. Ryacudu, ordered that "Chinese" associated 
with either the PKI or Chinese social organizations leave the province.23 This action 
was followed by a half-hearted effort to relocate and even expatriate ethnic Chinese 
from the interior. In early 1967 some five thousand alien Chinese were moved from 
their homes near the Sarawak border to Pontianak, the provincial capital, and plans 
were made to repatriate them to China, but the transport ship never arrived and most 
of the people eventually returned to their villages. Five thousand individuals was only 
the tip of the iceberg, of course: the military estimated that there were 450,000 ethnic 
Chinese living in West Kalimantan, three-quarters of whom did not have Indonesian 
citizenship papers.24 Nevertheless, there is little indication that the regime viewed the 
province or its large ethnic Chinese population to be of particular significance at the 
time.
Despite the new regime's ban on the PKI and the massacres in Java and Bali, West 
Kalimantan PKI leaders remained active. During the early 1960s, the PKI had grown 
rapidly under the able leadership of Said Achmad Sofyan (known locally by the 
Chinese name Tai Ko, meaning Big Brother).25 At the time of the military seizure of 
power in 1965, the party had an estimated 3,500 "members/sympathizers."26 During 
1966 and early 1967, the PKI built an extensive underground organization, culminating 
in April 1967 with the establishment of a "city committee" (komite kota) in 
Singkawang. Recruiting was then carried out throughout Pontianak and Sambas
22 Interview, Pontianak, May 16, 2000.
23 Antara Weekly Review, December 4,1965, p. 20 and December 11,1965, p. 19; Charles Coppel, Indonesian 
Chinese in Crisis (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 112; and Sejarah Daerah Kalimantan 
Barat (Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah, 1977/1978), p. 203. Ryacudu's son, Lieut. 
Gen. Ryamizard, is currently (early 2002) commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad).
24 Brigadir Djenderal TNI AJ Witono, "Rentjana Kerjda Tahun 1968: Komando Daerah Militer 
XH/Tandjungpura (Rentjana Pokok)" (Pontianak: Angkatan Darat Komando Daerah Militer 
XII/Tandjungpura, n.d.), p. 5. Extrapolating from earlier estimates, we believe the actual number might be 
closer to 350,000.
25 In 1960, leadership of the West Kalimantan PKI was passed from Moscow-oriented Bambang Sumitro to 
the Beijing-oriented Sofyan. According to military sources, Sofyan was pessimistic about the potential for 
party recruiting among ethnic Malays, and so focused the party's energies on the large Chinese population. 
Nevertheless, it appears that most positions in the West Kalimantan PIG were held by Javanese. For 
information on the PKI during this period, see Pelita 1975 (Pontianak: Kodam XH/Tanjungpura, 1975), and 
"Sejarah Singkat Kodam XII Tanjungpura: Proses Pertumbuhan Kodam XII Tanjungpura," Akcaya, July 18, 
1979. On October 16,1967, Bambang Sumitro and Saadi Abdullah, another PKI leader, were sentenced to 
death in Pontianak. See "Mendjeladjah Nusantara," Kompas, November 1,1967.
26 Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang: Sejarah Kodam XII/Tanjungpura (Kalimantan Barat, 1970), p. 226.
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districts, training exercises were held in Bong Pingsan, Mempawah Hulu, Pasi, and 
Singkawang, and coordination was strengthened between the urban centers and the 
nascent resistance in the forests.27 With favorable social and geographic conditions, the 
West Kalimantan PKI was not patiently going to await arrest or simply disappear. 
Sometime in late 1965 or perhaps early 1966, Sofyan and a group of followers fled 
from Pontianak to a forested mountain complex in the Bengkayang area,28 which they 
called Bukit Bara.29 The location of Bukit Bara placed Sofyan and his followers in the 
midst of the large rural Chinese population and within easy reach of their remaining 
PKI cadres on the coast. Given that PGRS/Paraku was primarily oriented towards 
Sarawak, the majority of its forces were located further north along the Sarawak-West 
Kalimantan border.30 While they may have enjoyed contact during 1966 and early 
1967, PGRS/Paraku and the PKI remained distinct groups.
In April 1967, Sofyan and his PKI colleagues met with members of the 
PGRS/Paraku in Sanggau Ledo subdistrict to plan a joint military offensive. Most 
sources claim that Sofyan sought out the much stronger PGRS/Paraku and joined their 
struggle.31 But there is reason to believe that the opposite is the case. According to 
Pelita 1975 (a book published by Kodam XH/Tanjungpura), sometime after the military 
seizure of power in Jakarta, PGRS forces then in Singkawang split over questions of 
strategy, some arguing for a frontal military attack against Sarawak, others for 
increased work and recruitment among the local population. As a result of this split, 
about thirty PGRS members under the leadership of Huang Han and Lim Yen Hwa left 
Singkawang to join with Sofyan's PKI in Sanggau Ledo subdistrict.32
Not until the first half of 1967 did the military begin a series of moves to reorganize 
the command structure and operations in West Kalimantan. One reason for this action 
may have been pressure exerted by Malaysia, which accused Jakarta of allowing 
communists to operate on its territory. On February 17,1967, Malaysia and Indonesia 
signed a secret security agreement regarding the border, and soon thereafter the
27 Some of those towns included Sebalau, Darit, Sompak, Meranti, Perigi, Takalong, Sangking, and Bong 
Pingsan. Pelita 1975, pp. 62-63. According to Soemadi, there were twenty such training centers. See 
Soemadi, PKB, pp. 82-86.
28 According to a military document, Sofyan was accompanied by Tan Bu Hiap (a member of the PKI's 
Legislative Countil); Pheng Chen Nen (a member of the PKI's Board of Daily Operations); Soekotjo (an 
ethnic Javanese bom in Solo, who attended high school in Pontianak district, and the provincial head of the 
PKI-affiliated Indonesian Peasant Front); Tugiman; Sumadi BsC (also an ethnic Javanese, and member of the 
PKI's Legislative Council); and Djuang (another member of the PKI's Legislative Council). "Penumpasan 
Terhadap Gerombolan Tjina Komunis Didearah Kalbar," (unpublished manuscript), p. 2.
29 Bara is not on any of the available maps of West Kalimantan. A hand-drawn map published in Kompas 
shows Bara to the northeast of Bengkayang, in a location where there is no major mountain complex. 
"Pengungsi Memang Tiada Lagi," Kompas, December 13,1967. Our best guess is that Bara is the Bavvang 
complex due north of Bengkayang. The name "Bara" is probably an acronym derived from Barisan Rnkyat 
(People's Front).
30 But note that the article, "Gerombolan Komunis menjelusup ke Kalbar," Kompas, September 4,1967, 
mentions the presence of PGRS troops on Mount Bawang, just north of Bengkayang.
31 For example, see "Laporan-Chusus Tentang Perkembangan Gerombolan PGRS Selama Tahun 1967 
Didaerah Kalbar" (Pontianak: Angkatan Darat Komando Antar Daerah Kalimantan, n.d.), p. 5.
32 "Penumpasan Terhadap Gerombolan Tjina Komunis Didaerah Kalbar" (unpublished manuscript), pp. 4- 
5; see also Pelita 1975, pp. 61-62. Given that military histories call all rebels "PGRS," it is equally possible 
that these were not PGRS members, but rather PKI.
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Indonesian military liquidated the Mandala Siaga Command.33 In March, military 
operations in West Kalimantan were placed under the All-Kalimantan Regional 
Command (Koanda Kalimantan) and Kodam XII/Tanjungpura (West Kalimantan). 
Furthermore, Kodam XII commander Brig. Gen. Ryacudu initiated Operation Clean 
Sweep I (Operasi Sapu Bersih I, involving only Kalimantan-based troops) in 
conjunction with Malaysia's Third Infantry Brigade. Nonetheless, only a limited 
number of sweeps were conducted, and there is little to suggest that the military took 
the problem seriously.34 There were a number of reasons for this: the transfer of combat 
operations from Kolaga to Koanda and Kodam XII was poorly coordinated; Kodam 
XII was not provided with information about the location or strength of the alleged 
communist threat; and the actual operations were conducted by poorly trained troops, 
many of whom were still teenagers (remaja). Kodam XII itself admitted that "our 
military forces and preparedness were extremely minimal."35
Finally, on June 29, 1967, Brig. Gen. Ryacudu was replaced as commander of 
Kodam XII by Brig. Gen. Witono Sarsono. Since he had done little to eradicate the rebel 
presence, it is not surprising that Ryacudu was replaced. But why was Witono selected 
as the new commander? A Catholic from Yogyakarta, Witono had served against the 
Darul Islam rebellion in West Java during the 1950s, was Chief of Staff of Kodam Jaya 
(Jakarta) in 1965, and then served as Army Deputy Assistant for Logistics during the 
operations against PKI remnants in Java in 1966-1967.36 Witono therefore was 
appointed as commander of Kodam XII because he had experience with anti-guerrilla 
operations and was well regarded by General Suharto.
III. Military Response
The second turning point came on July 16, 1967, when Sofyan and his new 
PGRS/Paraku allies staged a daring attack on the Singkawang II Airforce Base in 
Sanggau Ledo, resulting in the deaths of three Indonesian Airforce (Angkatan Udara 
Republik Indonesia) personnel and a civilian guard and the capture of 150 weapons.37 
Describing the attack as "a shocking blow that awoke us [to the seriousness of the 
problem]," the military moved quickly to respond.38 On July 26-28, Gen. Suharto met
33 See Brigadir Djenderal Ryacudu, "Laporan Pangdam Xll/Panghanda Kalbar Tentang Pelaksanaan 
'Operasi Sapu Bersih' Sedjak Tgl. 1 April '67 S/D  15 Djuni 1967" (Pontianak: Angkatan Darat Daerah 
Militer XII/Tandjungpura, June 16,1967), p. 1.
34 On May 23,1967, Kodam XII intelligence and one platoon from Infantry Battalion 641 carried out a 
sweep in the Batu Hitam mountain complex, where the rebels conducted training. On June 19,1967, units 
from Infantry Battalion 641 attacked PGRS forces in Kampung Sateng, with the PGRS fleeing to Sarawak. 
Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, p. 255; Effendy, Penghancuran PGRS-Paraku. dan PKI di Kalimantan 
Bar at, p. 129.
35 Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, p. 261.
36 See Harsja W. Bachtiar, Siapa Dia?, p. 468.
37 It is possible that the attack was related to the appointment of Witono as Kodam XII commander. Sofyan 
may have understood that Witono had been appointed to "eliminate" the communist presence in West 
Kalimantan, and so decided to strike first, both because he needed weapons and also to embarrass the new 
Kodam commander.
38 Soemadi, PKB, p. 87. An intelligence report states that the attack was carried out by the PGRS and 
mentions neither Sofyan nor the PKI. Majoor [sic] CPM Moeljono, "'Laporan Chusus' tentang adanja
62 Jamie S. Davidson and Douglas Kammen
in Jakarta with all of the Kalimantan commanders to discuss the situation in West 
Kalimantan and prepare new military operations.39 It is not clear how seriously these 
officials viewed the insurgency, but some idea of the official perception can be 
obtained from military estimates of the number of rebels. Soemadi, the Tanjungpura 
Regional Military Commander from 1969 to 1973, claims that when Sofyan fled to 
Bara he had ninety followers and the PGRS had sixty troops.40 Tanjungpura Berjuang, 
a military history of West Kalimantan's regional command, provides contradictory 
numbers for 1967: it reports that there were 545 rebels broken into four groups in 
March, two to three thousand rebels in April, and approximately seven hundred rebels 
in August.41 According to the Pontianak daily Akcaya, PGRS/Paraku had a total of 
3,250 members and supporters in mid-1967.42 And the Jakarta daily Kompas mentions 
that, in September, PGRS leader, Liem A Liem, had 2,000-2,500 troops.43 These 
conflicting figures for rebel forces suggest that the Indonesian army (TNI, Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia), the Suharto regime, and the loyal press were unwilling to admit 
that the rebellion was a domestic issue. Instead, they alternately argued that it was the 
work of PGRS/Paraku from Sarawak or of the People's Republic of China.44
So how do we make sense of these estimates? Soemadi's figure for the rebels with 
Sofyan's forces seems plausible, but that for PGRS/Paraku is far too low. One 
imagines that Soemadi came up with these numbers because the military later 
estimated that the July 1967 attack on the Sanggau Ledo airbase involved 150 rebels 
(perhaps because they stole 150 weapons). The figure reported in Tanjungpura 
Berjuang for the four groups is also possible, although it is essential to note that these 
were not the only rebels. Its second figure, which reports seven hundred "PGRS" rebels, 
would seem to be based on the fiction that this rebel force was entirely constituted of, 
and limited to, former volunteers. Finally, Tanjungpura Berjuang's final estimate of two 
to three thousand rebels (PGRS, Paraku, and PKI) is entirely plausible. The majority of 
these (perhaps 2,500) were PGRS/Paraku, and the remainder (perhaps as many as 
five hundred) were PKI and former "volunteers."
The Jakarta meeting set in motion immediate changes. On August 8, 1967, the 
military declared West Kalimantan an "Operations Area" (Daerah Operasi) and new
penjerangan Gerombolan PGRS terhadap LANU Singkawang II di SG. Ledo pada tanggal 16-7-1967 Dj. 
02.00 wita" (Pontianak: Komando Daerah Militer XII/Tandjungpura Polisi Militer, n.d.).
39 Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, p. 260.
40 Soemadi, PKB,p. 82.
41 See Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, pp. 245-248,262-263.
42 "Sejarah singkat Kodam XII/Tjpr (4): Dharma Bhakti Kodam XII Tanjungpura Dalam Operasi Keamanan 
& Pembangunan Daerah," Akcaya, July 19,1979.
43 "Gerombolan Komunis menjelusup ke Kalbar," Kompas, September 4,1967.
44 For one of the cruder such statements, see the editorial "Kantong RTT di Kalbar," Kompas, September 26, 
1967. This is worth quoting: "The [rebel] movement in Kalimantan is a tool of the PRC. The physical basis
of the resistance is supplied and controlled by the PRC___The PGRS has two functions. [First] by drawing
troops from Java, it will deplete the military forces there, and [second] to provide moral and physical 
support to the PKI underground [pki malam] in Java."
Indonesia's Unknown War and the Lineages of Violence 63
units from Java and Sumatra were sent to the region.45 By the end of the month, the 
military initiated Operation Clean Sweep II, which brought about a dramatic increase 
in TNI activity. Whereas military sources only mention one or two armed contacts 
between TNI and the "rebels" during the first half of 1967, these same sources report 
at least fifteen "armed contacts" in August alone.46 Despite this increase, military 
histories maintain that activities between August and December 1967 were not 
intended as a full-scale campaign against the rebels, but rather limited to preparation 
and intelligence operations. But internal military documents reveal that the army 
lacked an effective intelligence network in West Kalimantan.
During Konfrontasi, our field intelligence was handled by the Kopur command, 
but its pull-out created a vacuum, completely paralyzing our intelligence network. 
And many of the people in charge of intelligence during Konfrontasi supported 
the Peking/Djakarta axis. So it was difficult for this network to be used against 
the gang of Chinese communists [gerombolan Tjina Komunis]. Furthermore, today 
our enemy is a distinct ethnic group [satu ethnis group sendiri] with its own 
community and language we don't understand, making it difficult for our 
intelligence to penetrate.47
So instead of penetrating these rural Chinese communities, the army sought to uproot 
and physically remove them by drawing on the cliched anti-guerrilla tactic: "drain the 
water so the fish can't swim." The water, of course, was the huge rural Chinese 
population.
To do so, the military sought to provoke Dayaks to attack the ethnic Chinese and 
thereby drive them from the interior to the coast, where they could be controlled, 
counted, and prevented from providing supplies to the rebels. During September and 
early October, a series of atrocities were committed in the greater Bengkayang region, 
many now shrouded in myth. On September 3, 1967, nine Dayaks were kidnapped 
from Kampung Taum, Sanggau Ledo subdistrict, supposedly by a "Gang of Chinese 
Communists" (Gerombolan Tjina Komunis). Two days later a Special Forces (Resimen 
Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat, RPKAD) unit, working with locals, "found" the 
bodies. Soon thereafter, the Kodam XII spokesman was quoted in the military 
newspaper Angkatan Bersenjata saying that Dayaks should "take revenge for blood 
with blood."48 Following the attack in Taum, a Tumenggung (Dayak traditional leader) 
was killed in the Bengkayang area in late September. Stories circulated that his genitals 
had been cut off and sewn to a pole together with a note in Chinese characters, hence 
providing "evidence" that this atrocity was committed by "Tjina" (Chinese).49
45 "Penumpasan Terhadap Gerombolan Tjina Komunis Didaerah Kalbar," p. 2. New units included those 
from Special Forces (RPKAD), Infantry Battalion 328 (Djajeukeulot, West Java), and Paratroop Battalion 
Raiders 100 (Sumatra).
46 Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, p. 270.
47 "Penumpasan Terhadap Gerombolan Tjina Komunis Didaerah Kalbar," p. 5.
48 "Gerombolan PGRS makin kalap," Angkatan Bersenjata, September 21,1967.
49 Brigadir Djenderal TNI A. J. Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XH/Tandjungpura Tentang Gerakan Suku 
Dayak Terhadap GTK di Kal-Bar (II)" (Pontianak: Angkatan Darat Komando Daerah XII/Tandjungpura, 
December 4,1967), p. 3. Hereafter abbreviated Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura." The date 
of this killing is not known. This incident has taken on mythic proportions in West Kalimantan. These 
stories, however, usually lack specifics such as when and where the killing took place and who committed
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Remarkably, however, there are no reports of Dayaks taking revenge against the ethnic 
Chinese in September and early October. Rather, Dayak and Chinese villagers from the 
Mempawah Hilir, Mempawah Hulu, and Bengkayang areas conducted a series of 
traditional ceremonies (adat pemabang) in which they vowed: "Each villager, whether 
Dayak or Chinese or from another ethnic group, takes vows to unite against enemies 
who come from outside the community. Anyone who does not fulfill this promise will 
be subject to traditional law or evicted from the village and Dayak society."50
During the same period, additional violence was taking place along the coast. 
Between August and November 1967, there were a number of "incidents" involving 
PKI members in coastal towns and villages between Mempawah and Sungai Duri. The 
Kompas daily suggested that these were caused by PKI members who distributed 
leaflets with Maoist teachings and anti-ABRI messages along the border and in Kapuas 
Hulu District.51 While possible, it seems more likely that these "incidents" were the 
result of military sweeps to arrest the communist underground (something Ryacudu 
had failed to do), perhaps with the aid of local informants 52 Furthermore, these 
informants may have included former PKI members or sympathizers who, in the 
changed environment of 1967, hoped that by cooperating with the new regime they 
themselves would avoid arrest.
In October, the military stepped up direct combat operations against the rebels, 
staging a series of sweeps in the Sungkung complex around Buduk Hill and in Sambas 
district from Seluas southward to Sanggau Ledo, Bengkayang, and Merebuk (see Map 
below).53 On October 12, RPKAD units moved east from Sanggau Ledo toward the 
village of Segondo, on the edge of the large Sungkung mountain complex. The following 
day the military attacked the rebel groups in three locations "along the front": on 
Buduk Hill, at Bulatik, and on Mount Merebuk.54 These locations are crucial for 
understanding military intentions. Buduk Hill is in the Sungkung complex, a major
the murder. One high-ranking Dayak civil servant maintains that Tumenggung Garanase was killed 
sometime in September in Teriak Madang village, a few kilometers outside the town of Bengkayang. Most 
sources insist that the Tumenggung was mutilated by the military, not the PGRS or PKI. Interview, 
Pontianak, July 21, 2000.
50 Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura," p. 4.
51 See "Mendjeladjah Nusantara," Kompas, August 18,1967; "Adjaran Mao disebarkan di Kalimantan 
Barat," Kompas, September 9,1967; and "Nampaknja Simpang-siur, Tapi Djelas Polanja," Kompas, January 
4, 1968.
52 See "Anggota2 Gerombolan Bersendjata Tjina Komunis Ditangkapi," Kompas, August 9,1967. This 
article mentions that some of the individuals arrested were military officers with the ranks of major and 
lieutenant colonel.
53 Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, pp. 270-271; and Soemadi, PKB, pp. 171-172. It should be noted that 
both Sambas and Pontianak districts were recently divided, creating the new districts of Bengkayang and 
Landak. For the purposes of this paper, we refer to the district demarcations current at the time.
54 Trisno Juwono, "Mengikuti RPKAD dan Kudjang Menumpas PGRS di Kalimantan Barat: Pertempuran 
Hutan Buduk," parts I and II, Kompas, May 10 and May 11,1968.
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PGRS/Paraku hideout.55 The location of Bulatik is not known, although it may be the 
same as "Jelatuk," on the fringe of the Bawang complex, north of Bengkayang. Finally, 
Mount Merebuk is some forty kilometers south of Bengkayang, an area in which some 
rebels (most likely PKI) took refuge after the attack on the airforce base in Sanggau 
Ledo.56
An article in the military daily Angkatan Bersenjata provides the following 
description of the attack on Mount Merebuk:
Infantry Battalion 328 killed 25 communist PGRS with heavy fire, seized one bren 
gun, three other weapons, and six tons of rice. This close engagement occurred 
around Mount Merabuk in the Bengkajang area, where the rebels were strongest. 
Despite their large numbers, the rebels could not put up resistance and fled into 
the forest in disarray. Aided by local residents, our troops followed in pursuit.57 58
While this account clearly states that TNI personnel killed rebels, a history 
commissioned and published by Kodam XII/Tanjungpura provides an 
uncharacteristically vague account of activities in the same area: "According to 
sources, on October 13,1967, 46 gang members [gerombolan] were killed in the Mount 
Merebuk area. It turned out that some of these were Chinese villagers who had 
participated in the previous peace ceremonies [upacara pemabang]."5S Where the 
Angkatan Bersenjata reports twenty-five killed, this source mentions forty-six deaths. 
Where the Angkatan Bersenjata reports that "PGRS" were killed by the military, this 
source does not say who was responsible for the massacre of both Dayaks and 
Chinese. Stranger still, this source calls the villagers a "gang" (gerombolan), a word 
normally reserved for the communist rebels. So who did what to whom? It appears 
that there were two separate massacres, one of "PGRS" rebels and the other involving 
Dayak and Chinese villagers. The first of these was reported in the national press as a 
military success; meanwhile, the military spread word locally that "Chinese PGRS" 
were responsible for killing the villagers so as to instigate Dayak revenge against the 
rural Chinese community.
55 There is a problem of location here. A map in Kompas, December 13,1967, shows Mount Buduk due east 
of Bengkayang and north of Sosok. The Propinsi Kalimantan Barat map shows a Mount Buduk about forty- 
five kilometers further east, in Sanggau District. We believe that the Buduk in question for this operation is 
neither of these; instead, it must be within hiking distance of Segondo, i.e. in the western part of the 
Sungkung complex, near Mount Niyut. There is a Buduk river in this location.
56 Merebuk (sometimes spelled Merabuk or Merebukan) does not appear on any New Order maps or 
military publications. The 1973 topographical maps produced by the British military show a Mount 
Gamarabak west of Sidas, and slightly north of Pahauman. See Map TPC L -ll DG, Director of Military 
Survey, Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, 1973. Sources in West Kalimantan suggest that Merebuk is 
further north, between Darit and Bengkayang.
57 "25 PGRS Tewas," Angkatan Bersenjata, October 23,1967.
58 Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, p. 276.
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Map: West Kalimantan
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IV. Massacres
On October 14, the day after the Mount Merebuk military sweep, in the village of 
Taum—the same village from which nine Dayaks were kidnapped and killed a month 
before—an estimated sixty Dayaks launched a retaliatory attack, killing eighty Chinese 
and one Dayak.59 The violence then spread southward into Pontianak District, hitting 
the Anjungan-Mandor-Menjalin triangle particularly hard.60 For several weeks, Chinese 
fled towards the provincial capital, Pontianak, while others found shelter in and 
around Singkawang. There are conflicting accounts of this violence. A Dutch pastor, 
Van Hulten, working in the area at the time, described the large-scale Dayak attacks as 
"sudden" yet "well organized."61 According to the military, Dayaks believed that the 
Chinese had broken the Pemabang Oath and mobilized in revenge by the passing of the 
red bowl (mangkok merah), which symbolizes a call to war 62 In the eyes of the military, 
of course, an attack against the rural Chinese population was an attack against the 
PGRS/Paraku/PKI rebels. Oddly, there are also reports that Dayak leaders had 
placed a prohibition on killing or burning the homes of ethnic Chinese in this area.63
In mid-November, massacres erupted on an even larger scale. The first incident 
occurred in the town of Senakin, in the central part of Pontianak district, where a 
group of Dayaks held a "demonstration" (demonstrasi) to threaten the local Chinese. 
The Chinese fired "warning" shots to disperse the crowd, allegedly wounding two 
Dayaks and killing one.64 The following day Dayaks took revenge, killing large numbers
59 Although this massacre did not make the press for several months, the Angkatan Bersenjata later ran an 
article explaining that the PKI and the affiliated Indonesian Peasant Front (Barisan Tani Indonesia) were 
the masterminds behind the attack. See "Oknum Ex PKI & BTI Dalang Pembunuhan Besar2an Di Kalbar," 
Angkatan Bersenjata, January 17,1968, which mistakenly dates the attack October 26 and calls the village 
"Tamu."
60 Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura," p. 6, lists 249 ethnic Chinese deaths in the entire 
region:
Sambas District
Sei Betung as many as 20 people
Sepatung as many as 9 people
Mempawah (Pontianak) District
Senakin as many as 70 people
Darit as many as 50 people
Sebadu as many as 90 people
Total 249 people.
Note that this list does not include the eighty people killed in Kampung Taum.
61 Herman Josef Van Hulten, Hidupku di Antara Suku Daya: Catatan Seorang Misionaris (Jakarta: P. T. 
Grasindo, 1992 [translated from 1983 original]), p. 280. Van Hulten maintains that the violence reached the 
Anjungan-Mandor-Menjalin area on October 17, but military sources cite October 29. See Witono, 
"Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura," p. 5.
62 Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura," pp. 4-5.
63 Van Hulten, Hidupku di Antara Suku Daya, p. 281. In an interview years later Oevaang Oeray also 
mentioned the prohibition on killing. See David Jenkins, "The Last Headhunt," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, June 30,1978, p. 25.
64 Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura," p. 6. Interviews conducted in Pahauman suggest that 
those shot did not die, but rumors spread that they had. One source places the death toll in Senakin at 
seventy-seven. See "Pengungsi Memang Tiada Lagi," Rompas, December 13,1967.
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of Chinese. This incident triggered violence along the two major roads in the region, one 
running east-west along the Mempawah-Ngabang axis and the other extending from 
Sidas north to Bengkayang. In Menyuke subdistrict, the Angkatan Bersenjata reported 
"a massive killing of hundreds of Chinese."65 Further south, the towns of Senakin, 
Pahauman, and Sidas were "the most devastated and had the greatest number of 
people killed."66 And to the west in Menjalin, Pastor Van Hulten recalled "horrifying 
murders."67
There were also attempts to fan the flames northward. In the northern part of the 
Sanggau Ledo area, a Dayak militia was formed at the insistence of local military 
officials, but because it was limited to a handful of Dayaks, this small force did not 
conduct attacks.68 Many of the men in this area had recently returned from years of 
military service, mostly as border guards but some as raiders, under Konfrontasi. Tired 
of fighting, they resisted these military machinations. People in Sanggau Ledo recall 
that a mangkok merah was also passed, but local community leaders rejected the call to 
war. Thousands of Chinese were forced to leave the area, but did so under orderly 
military escort. In northern Sambas, Dayak leaders worked with local military officers 
and church officials to prevent the violence from spreading north, thus sparing much of 
northern Sambas.69
How many Chinese were massacred during the so-called demonstrasi in late 1967? 
Van Hulten and Jenkins both cite the figure of three thousand killed, while Peterson 
says that "[t]he figure of 2,000 Chinese killed is no exaggeration."70 Oral sources vary 
considerably, with estimates ranging from a few hundred to several thousand 
fatalities. Ethnic Chinese in Pontianak interviewed more than thirty years later usually 
offer more conservative estimates, downplaying the significance of these events. In 
contrast, Dayak interviewees, particularly those close to Oevaang Oeray, furnish much 
higher totals, apparently proud of the violence and their former prowess.71
Accounts of the 1967 mobilizations and massacres stress the "spontaneity" of 
Dayak actions against the gangs of godless communist rebels. Presenting the 
mobilizations and ensuing violence as "spontaneous" served at least three purposes. 
First, such a characterization distanced the military from involvement in organizing 
and planning the mobilizations. Second, a description of the attacks as "spontaneous"
65 "Oknum Ex PKI & BTI Dalang Pembunuhan Besar2an di Kalbar/' Angkatan Bersenjata, January 17,
1968. One Dayak recalls that for years following these killings locals were still afraid to drink from the 
Menyuke River because of the number of corpses tossed into the river. Interview, Pontianak, December 12, 
2000.
66 "Nampaknja Simpang-siur, tapi Djelas Polanja," Kompas, January 1,1968.
67 Van Hulten, Hidupku di Antara Suku Daya, p. 294. For a sensationalistic missionary account, see Robert 
Peterson, Storm Over Borneo (London: Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1968), pp. 25-26.
68 The formation of these militia called Lasykar Pangsuma will be discussed shortly.
69 Various interviews, Pontianak and Sanggau Ledo, May 22 and July 22-26, 2000.
70 See Van Hulten, Hidupku di Antara Suku Daya, p. 295, who mentions having read this figure but does not 
provide a source; Jenkins, "The Last Headhunt," p. 25; Peterson, Storm Over Borneo, p. 21. Note that the 
military history Tanjungpura Berjuang is specific about the numbers killed prior to November 14 but silent 
on the death toll thereafter. It should also be noted that these estimates do not include the deaths of Chinese 
incurred in detainment camps.
71 Various interviews, Pontianak, May to November, 2000.
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suggested that there was a deep-rooted and uniform Dayak animosity towards the 
local Chinese, ignoring the immense linguistic and cultural variations among Dayaks 
and forgetting the broad range of relations between Dayak groups and Chinese 
communities. Lastly, it portrayed Dayaks as emotional, irrational, primitive warriors 
prone to excesses and unable to differentiate between the good and the bad Chinese. In 
early January 1968, a national parliamentary mission visited the region and concluded 
that there was no evidence of military involvement, although it noted that Dayaks 
were "now helping in the [military] operations to wipe out the PGRS rebels."72
Despite these repeated claims that the massacres took place spontaneously, 
military histories provide detailed accounts of ABRI involvement before, during, and 
after the violence. The military actively recruited "traditional Dayak chiefs" to wage 
war against the PGRS/Paraku/PKI forces, granting them titles as "War Commanders 
with the titular rank of Lieutenant."73 Weapons were distributed and efforts were 
made to encourage "traditional" Dayak war practices, including the passing of the red 
bowl and head-hunting (mengayau.). In the words of Gen. Soemadi, the Dayak were 
told "anyone who sides with the PGRS-PARAKU enemies can be beheaded like a pig 
or a chicken." He further boasts that "the enthusiasm for taking heads (Ngayau) flared 
up everywhere, and the [head-takers] were always escorted by our soldiers."74
The military also rewarded Dayaks for the use of violence against the Chinese by 
holding head-hunting feasts: "With each victory of the Dayak People in these 
kampungs, we always held traditional victory fests with dancing and drinking of rice 
liquor from the skulls of PGRS-PARAKU members killed by the local people."75 In 
addition to these head-hunting feasts, the military also arranged "traditional" peace 
ceremonies (upacara perdamaian), the first of which were reportedly held on October 24 
and November 5,1967, although the violence continued for weeks thereafter.76 In sum, 
military authorities encouraged Dayak violence against the rural Chinese. For the 
military, the problem was not simply the communist insurgents, but also the tens of 
thousands of rural ethnic Chinese, whom the military believed to be supplying and 
protecting the communists.
But military encouragement does not fully explain why the violence moved south 
away from PGRS/Paraku and PKI strongholds. It also fails to explain why retaliatory 
Dayak attacks against the ethnic Chinese began in mid-October. In other words, why 
did neither of the first two attacks—i.e. the early September killings in Kampung Taum 
and the later killing of the Tumenggung—not trigger an immediate Dayak response? To
72 "Kesan2 Rombongan DPRGR: Tidak Benar ABRI Gerakkan Suku Daya Melawan Tjina," Angkatan 
Bersenjata, January 12, 1968.
73 Pelita 1975 lists the names of twenty-three Dayak war leaders (panglima) who were bestowed with 
honorary military titles (Pelda Kehormatan). Pelita 1975, pp. 92-93. See also "K'mantan Barat bicara dg 
bahasa pembangunan," Utama, March 3,1973.
74 Soemadi, PKB, pp. 94 and 96. The originals read: "barang siapa memihak kepada musuh PGRS-PARAKU, 
bisa dipotong lehemya seperti memotong babi dan ayam ...."; and "Semangat memenggal kepala (Ngayau) 
meluap dimana-mana sambil didampingi selalu oleh prajurit-prajurit kita."
75 Ibid., p. 96. The original: "Bagi tiap-tiap kemenangan Rakyat Dayak di Kampung-kampung tersebut, 
selalu kita adakan pesta-pesta kemenangan yang tradisional, dengan cara menari-menari, minum tuwak 
dimana tengkorak-tengkorak PGRS-PARAKU yang telah terbunuh oleh rakyat tersebut dibawa serta."
76 "Kalbar Panas," Kompas, November 14,1967.
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understand why the violence was largely concentrated in an eighty-to-ninety square 
mile triangle between coastal Sungai Pinyuh in the west, Bengkayang to the north, and 
Ngabang to the east, and to understand why the massacres broke out when they did, 
we need to turn briefly to local Dayak elite politics at the time.
The key figure was Oevaang Oeray, the former Dayak Governor of West 
Kalimantan, who was once likened as being "to the Dayaks what Sukarno was once 
for the Indonesians."77 Oeray first rose to regional prominence under the tutelage of the 
Dutch and Sultan Hamid II, a well-known Dutch collaborator and the titular head of 
the Special Region of West Kalimantan (DIKB, Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat). In 
1946, Oeray headed the newly formed Dayak Affairs Office (Kantor Urusan Dayak) 
and soon thereafter sat on the DIKB's five-member governing board (Badan 
Pemerintah Harian). In April 1950, Sultan Hamid was arrested on charges of treason, 
and soon thereafter Oeray was "banished" from the provincial capital and appointed 
as District Executive (bupati) of Kapuas Hulu, the province's most remote district. 
Followed by a similar posting in Sintang district, Oeray's political career was 
resurrected largely thanks to the strong showing of the Dayafk] Unity Pajjty (PD, 
Partai Persatuan Daya) in the 1955 general and the 1958 regional elections. Backed by 
the PD and Sukarno's desire for native sons (putera daerah) to lead the provinces, 
Oeray was appointed governor in 1960. After Law 7/1959 banned all regional parties, 
Oeray and his followers established a provincial chapter of the left-leaning Partindo 
(Partai Indonesia).78 In July 1966, New Order authorities removed Oeray from the 
governorship, accusing him of being a Sukamoist, and posted him in the Department of 
Domestic Affairs in Jakarta.79
A year later, the PGRS/Paraku rebellion provided an opportunity for Oeray to 
make a comeback in West Kalimantan.80 Following the Tumenggung killing in late 
September, a number of Dayak leaders (pemuka) from the Bengkayang area came to 
Pontianak to meet with Oeray.81 Soon after these consultations, a Dayak "declaration 
of war" against the Chinese was announced over Radio Indonesia (RRI)82 and a Dayak
77 Herb Feith, "Dayak Legacy," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 25,1968, p. 134.
78 Another group of Dayaks, headed by F. C. Palaoensoeka, the lone PD representative in the national 
parliament, joined forces with the small Catholic Party (Partai Katolik). The repercussions of this split, 
which largely spelled the end of Dayak political dominance in West Kalimantan, are still felt today.
79 By 1968, all four Dayak bupati—M. Th. Djaman (Sanggau), G. P. Djaoeng (Sintang), J. R. Gielling (Kapuas 
Hulu), and A. Djelani (Pontianak District)—had been replaced by military officers.
80 Sources maintain that, although moved to Jakarta, Oeray frequently visited the region, having only to 
report to military authorities upon arrival. As for Oeray's motives, he may have seen the military's desire 
to relocate the rural Chinese population as an opportunity to disprove the leftist accusations against him 
and a chance to gain the confidence of the new regime. In an interview years later Oeray explained that "the 
initiative" to clear the border region of Chinese "came from me." Quoted in Jenkins, "The Last Headhunt," 
p. 25. Or perhaps the military approached Oeray, believing that only Oeray had the capacity to mobilize 
sufficient numbers of Dayaks.
81 Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura," p. 3. Whether they came on their own initiative or 
were summoned to Pontianak is not known.
82 According to one anonymous source, he and a number of Dayak students were at Oeray7s house when 
two men dressed in military attire visited to inform Oeray of the announcement. The source adds that the 
announcement was not made by Oeray, but rather by someone impersonating his voice. Interview, 
Pontianak, July 21, 2000.
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militia called Lasykar Pangsuma was established to "lead and channel the spontaneity 
of the movement . . . according to instructions."83 At the end of October, Dayak 
leaders in Pontianak also announced:
We warmly welcome this Dayak spontaneity in the form of active and physical 
assistance to ABRI's campaign to eliminate the PGRS gang and its lackeys. This 
spontaneity has emerged as an awareness of a national duty for each responsible 
citizen of the Indonesian Republic to help and join in saving one's country and 
people from danger in any form.84
While eager to prove his nationalism and anti-communism to the new regime, 
Oeray was also driven by economic motives. He calculated that forcing the ethnic 
Chinese out of rural Pontianak district would clear the way for the development of a 
Dayak-dominated economic zone in the Anjungan-Mandor-Menjalin triangle. While the 
cultural and linguistic diversity subsumed under the rubric "Dayak" suggests the need 
to pinpoint which groups participated in the 1967 violence—in this case Kanaytn, 
Banyuke, Rara Bakati', Bukit, Behe Dait, and Mampawah Dayaks—it is in fact more 
instructive to deconstruct the "Dayak" label along political lines 85 Oeray enjoyed 
strong support in Mempawah Hulu and Menyuke subdistricts, both of which lay just 
beyond the prized Anjungan-Mandor-Menjalin triangle. It was not difficult for him to 
mobilize supporters in these areas 86 In other words, Dayaks influenced by Oeray and 
the Lasykar Pangsuma, as opposed to those aligned with Palaoensoeka and the 
Catholic Party, were more likely to participate in the violent demonstrasi.
But Oeray's plan backfired. In its efforts to subordinate local politics to "national" 
concerns, the nascent New Order denied Dayaks key positions, and neither Oeray nor 
his followers subsequently enjoyed any real influence in the new regime 87 Furthermore,
83 Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura," p. 7. A coordinating body of Lasykar Pangsuma, 
named after the Dayak panglima who resisted Japanese incursions into the interior during World War II, 
sat in Pontianak while smaller branches were established throughout Sambas and Pontianak districts. 
Dayak leaders living in Pontianak and Singkawang have either refused to comment on their involvement in 
the militia or have done so cautiously.
84 "Nampaknja Simpang-siur, Tapi Djelas Polanja," Kompas, January 4,1968.
85 Standard figure for the number of sub-ethnic Dayak groups in West Kalimantan is 450. J. U. Lontaan, 
Sejarah Hukum Adat and Adat Istiadat Kalimantan Barat (Pontianak: Pemda Tk. I Kalbar, 1975). Yet, several 
elder Dayak sources dismiss Lontaan's figure and insist that the total is closer to 145. A local Dayak NGO 
(Institute of Dayakology, ID) is currently mapping the range of ethno-linguistic diversity among West 
Kalimantan's Dayak population. The sub-ethnic group names used above (and their spellings) are based on 
ID's ongoing research.
86 Van Hulten, Hidupku di Antara Suku Daya, pp. 283-284; interview with one of Oeray's former 
bodyguards, Pontianak, October 2,2000. A newspaper article from the period suggests that the "people's 
demonstration" was "orchestrated for material and political purposes," although it makes no mention of 
Oeray. See "15.000 Pengungsi Tjina Masuki Kota Singkawang," Kompas, November 15,1967. F. C. 
Palaoensoeka, an Oeray rival who opposed the mobilizations, also mentioned that "provocateurs" 
(penghasut) were involved. See "'Demonstrasi liar di Kalbar bertentangan dgn Tertib Hukum," Kompas, 
November 11,1967. Another article explicitly says that "rogues working for the former governor of West 
Kalimantan—a Partindo member—instigated the Dayaks." See "Latarbelakang Pengungsian Besar2an di 
Kalbar," Kompas, November 23,1967. Apparently, Palaoensoeka—a Catholic and a member of the national 
parliament since 1955—used his connections at the paper to discredit Oeray.
87 It is not clear what happened to Oeray immediately following these events, although sources suggest that 
he was sent back to his desk job in Jakarta. One source cynically sniped, "After the instrument is used, it is
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the late 1967 violence destroyed distribution and transportation networks in 
Pontianak and Sambas districts and paralyzed the economy.88 Although some Dayaks 
occupied Chinese-owned land and moved into the marketplace to become small-scale 
traders, Malays, Javanese, and Madurese benefited far more. When asked what the 
Dayaks achieved from the mobilizations, a Dayak elder exclaimed "Nothing! Look, go 
to Anjungan. Who owns all the shops? Not Dayaks!"89
In sum, the violence in 1967—portrayed by the New Order as a spontaneous action 
by Dayaks against the communist Chinese—involved three distinct components. First, 
the military initiated a new offensive against rebels throughout a broad area in the 
northern part of the province. Second, the military conducted sweeps to arrest or kill 
the PKI underground along the western seaboard. Third, and of greatest importance, 
the military, working together with opportunistic Dayak leaders, organized, armed, 
and encouraged Dayaks to massacre rural ethnic Chinese. These three components 
were integral parts of a single military campaign. Some of the military's goals were 
reached, but these actions also drove some rural Chinese as well as former PKI 
members to seek protection by joining Sofyan and the PGRS/Paraku, and hence further 
fueled rebellion in West Kalimantan.
V. Relocation and Internment
The massacres of late 1967 and early 1968 were accompanied by the massive 
relocation of ethnic Chinese southward to Pontianak and westward to the Sambas 
coast. The mid-October violence touched off these relocations, but reports of refugees 
fleeing do not surface until a month later. Some fled under heavy duress, some of their 
own accord, while others were "escorted" by the military. Besides the Chinese, some 
Javanese, Malay, and Madurese also fled in fear, but soon returned to their homes or 
occupied Chinese land. The majority of the refugees were housed in Pontianak and 
Singkawang, with smaller numbers in the towns of Mempawah, Sambas, and 
Pemangkat.
Government statistics published in late 1968 show that there were nearly sixty 
thousand refugees, with other estimates as high as 75,000.90 The most striking feature 
of the data is the comparison between Pontianak, where the number of refugees in 
camps decreased dramatically by August 1968, and Singkawang (Sambas district), 
where it remained virtually unchanged (see columns A in the table below). This sheds 
light on the manner in which die military perceived these two groups—as distinct from 
one another—despite military propaganda that painted the entire rural Chinese
tossed aw ay/' A few years later Oeray reappeared as the head of the West Kalimantan Investigating 
Committee of Legislative Candidates for the 1971 general election, and from 1977-1982 served as a Golkar 
representative from West Kalimantan in the largely ceremonial People's Representative Council (DPR). 
Oeray died of heart failure on July 18,1986.
88 Van Hulten, Hidupku di Antara Suku Daya, pp. 283, 296-297; "Masalah Perekonomian Jang Pelik," 
Kompas, December 14,1967; and "Nampaknja Simpang-siur, Tapi Djelas Polanja," Kompas, January 4,1968.
89 Interview, Pontianak, July 31, 2000.
90 Soemadi claims that 75,000 "Cina" (Chinese) were relocated to coastal areas in late 1967. Soemadi, PKB, 
p. 177.
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population as conspirators allied with the PGRS/Paraku and PKI rebels. The military 
knew that rebel strongholds were in Sambas district and not Pontianak district, one 
reason why we highlighted the ironic southward spread of the violence. So, when the 
time came to resettle the Chinese refugees, the military balked at resettling those in 
Sambas. In fact, this caution suggests that from the outset the military viewed the 
Sambas Chinese as "detainees," not refugees.
Table 1. Refugees in West Kalimantan, 1967-1968
Re-registration Post-resettlement
November 1967 May 1968 August 1968
A B c A B c A B C
Singkawang & 
surroundings
14,161 8,501 22,662 14,161 4,240 18,401 12,788 4,240 17,028
Pontianak 18,186 7,483 25,669 10,775 7,483 18,258 2,759 7,483 10,242
Mempawah & 
surroundings
- 11,519 11,519 - 7,282 7,282 - 758 758
Totals 32,347 27,503 59,850 24,936 19,005 43,941 15,547 12,481 28,028
Notes: A: Refugees in camps. B: Refugees with families. C: A + B 
Source: Progress Report, Propinsi Kalimantan Barat (Disampaikan sebagai bahan kepada Departemen 
Dalam Negeri dalam rangka kundjungan Presiden RI ke Kalimantan Barat, tanggal 17 s /d  18 Oktober 
1968), Appendix VI.
Visitors to the camps described horrifying conditions. Extreme overcrowding, 
pitiful food rations, scant medical supplies, leprosy, malaria, children with bloated 
stomachs, assaults by guards, and suicide were all common.91 In January 1968, in 
Pontianak alone, 508 refugees reportedly died, and by April 1968, nearly 1,500 
children between the ages of one and eight had starved to death.92 One British 
journalist who visited the camps maintains that by early 1968 nearly four thousand 
Chinese had perished 93 Although Feith reports that refugees in Pontianak camps were 
free to come and go, this was not true of similar facilities located in Singkawang, 
Pemangkat, and Sambas, which were clearly "detainment" camps. One of these 
detainment camps in Pemangkat, a small town at the mouth of the Sambas river 
estuary, held more than 2,619 individuals charged with "involvement in 
PGRS/Paraku." Another account describes a "barbed-wired camp for North 
Kalimantan People's Guerrilla Force (Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Kalimantan Utara) and 
Communist detainees" on the outskirts of Singkawang.94
91 See Feith, "Dayak Legacy/' pp. 134-135; "Teauka Tolui.. .Tauke Minta Duit," Kompas, December 7, 
1967; "Apakah Akibat2 Pengatjuan PGRS Itu Sekarang?" Marian Kami, March 25,1968; and "Penjaluran 
Pengungsi dan Beberapa Kesulitan," Marian Kami, March 26,1968.
92 "Penjaluran Pengungsi dan Beberapa Kesulitan," Harian Kami, March 26,1968, and "SOS Bagi 
Pengungsi Korban PGRS," Marian Kami, April 15,1968. No reports exist on the number of deaths in 
Singkawang; yet, most sources maintain that hundreds perished. One source remembers that proper burial 
ceremonies were rarely conducted as corpses were simply thrown into sizable mass graves. There is now 
talk of excavating these graves. Interviews, Singkawang, December 5-9,2000.
93 Garth Alexander, Silent Invasion: The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London, MacDonald & Co., 1973), p. 3.
94 Masdan Rozhany, "Resetlement orang2 Cina perbatasan dilakukan atas dasar rasa prikemanusian dan 
keadilan," Utama, March 30,1973 and "'Singkawang akan berkembang menjadi kota pariwisata di 
Kalimantan Barat'?," Utama, April 4,1973.
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A plethora of obstacles plagued relief efforts, three of which are worth mentioning. 
First, the magnitude of this crisis simply overwhelmed local officials, who were ill- 
prepared and under-financed. In November 1967, the government formed a Contact 
Body for Chinese Affairs (Badan Kontak Urusan Tjina), but it was not until April 
1968 that it established a Special Committee on the Refugee Problem (Panitia Chusus 
Masalah Pengungsi). Second, poor communication between officials and refugees, 
many of whom spoke little or no Indonesian, also hampered relief efforts.95 Lastly, 
military and political pressure provided additional headaches for relief workers. The 
military insisted that relief efforts were not to obstruct their operations—operations 
included, for instance, "screenings" of refugee camps to search for suspected rebels— 
while local politicians used disturbances in the camps caused by the arrival of supplies 
as an excuse to expel relief workers.96
With Pontianak's mayor promising a city "free from refugees" by May 1968, the 
government began to "channel" refugees into permanent locations. Plans were made for 
nine projects accommodating nine thousand families in Pontianak district, one project 
for 1,500 families in Ketapang district, and five projects for four thousand families in 
Sambas district.97 These plans, however, never fully materialized, and no more than a 
few thousand ethnic Chinese were actually resettled on agricultural estates.98 While a 
few thousand returned inland to towns like Bengkayang and Ngabang, the vast 
majority became laborers, peasants, fishermen, and small-scale traders in and around 
the coastal cities of Singkawang, Mempawah, Sungai Pinyuh, and Pontianak. Still 
others left the province for Jakarta and elsewhere.
As the rebellion dragged on during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the military 
undertook further "relocations," principally in areas not affected by the original spate 
of violence. In October 1970, seventeen thousand ethnic Chinese were relocated from 
the border regions in Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu districts to areas along the 
Kapuas River.99 In December 1972, at least ten thousand additional Chinese were 
moved from the northern interior of Sambas district to areas along the Pemangkat-
95 Hamzah Haz, then a student activist with The Joint Action Front of Indonesian Students (KAMI, 
Kesatuan aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia,) in Pontianak and currently the Vice-President of Indonesia, is 
quoted as saying, "The one and only word they [the Chinese] know is 'money'; that's all." See "Penjaluran 
Pengungsi dan Beberapa Kesulitan," Harian Kami, March 26,1968.
96 Private relief agencies—such as the Indonesian Red Cross, the West Borneo Christian Organization for 
Aid to Refugees, and Bhakti Suci—also played a role in addressing the refugee crisis. The military argued 
that the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war did not apply because no declaration of war had been 
made. Reported in "Tidak Berlaku Konvensi Djenewa Bagi Tawanan2 PARAKU/PGRS," Kompas, October 
7,1971. For the expulsion of relief workers, see "SOS Bagi Pengungsi Korban PGRS," Harian Kami, April 
15, 1968.
97 "Penjaluran Pengungsi dan Beberapa Kesulitan," Harian Kami, March 26,1968.
98 Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, p. 284, lists only four such projects and offers a figure of 6,304 
refugees resettled.
99 Soemadi, PKB, p. 91. Kadarusno, then the Commander of Sintang Military Resort/121 and later 
Governor of West Kalimantan, claims to have initiated the relocation of the Chinese from the border region. 
Interview, Jakarta, June 15,2001. Note that in early 1969 the Suharto regime discussed sending some sixty 
thousand Class "C" PKI prisoners to the Benua Martinus area in the eastern part of West Kalimantan. It 
appears that this refers to PKI from outside Kalimantan, but it is possible that it also included "refugees" 
on the West Kalimantan coast. See "Kerdjasama Dg Serawan Menumpas PGRS Lantjar," Angkatan 
Bersenjata, January 29, 1969.
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Tebas-Sambas road.100 In all, between 1967 and 1972 some 100,000 ethnic Chinese 
were relocated from the rural interior to coastal cities and towns. The scale of these 
anti-Chinese operations is almost as astonishing as the success of the regime's cover- 
up.
VI. State-Building and Development
Early on, New Order authorities were aware of their tenuous legitimacy and 
minimal control in West Kalimantan's vast hinterland. The military admitted that 
"only the trustworthy obedience of the Dayak towards government has prevented a 
violent, negative reaction towards us. If not for this, it is possible that we could 
experience what the Japanese army did during World War II."101 Confronted by this 
situation, the authorities resolved to supplement their military operations with 
political efforts. At a meeting held in July 1967, led by Gen. Suharto, they initiated a 
program for "Consolidation and Development" (Konsolidasi dan Pembangiman) in 
West Kalimantan. This involved converting the people of West Kalimantan—including 
both the Chinese and Dayaks—into obedient and loyal citizens of the Indonesian 
Republic via state-building and development. Exterminating the insurgents, therefore, 
was never simply a matter of military operations.
The military was fully aware that the Chinese and Dayaks had a long history of 
close relations, including intermarriage, which meant that it was crucially important for 
ABRI to prevent Dayaks from siding with the "Chinese" communists. Moreover, the 
military was convinced that as long as Dayak lives and trade were oriented towards 
Sarawak, they would remain susceptible to communist influences. The military sought 
to combat this by "planting a national feeling" and "spreading the influence of the 
government of the Republic of Indonesia" among the "backward" (terbelakang) inland 
inhabitants.102 To do so, the state set out to count, organize, and control almost every 
aspect of these villagers' lives. By April 1971, a large survey team consisting of dozens 
of "experts" from Jakarta had arrived in the border area to produce detailed reports 
on the border populations and to help plan development projects.103
100 Komandan Korem 121 /  ABW, "Peranan ABRI dan Masyarakat dalam Penumpasan Gerakan 
PGRS/PARAKU di Kalimantan Barat," paper presented at the Sarasehan Kajian Sejarah Peijuangan di 
Kalimantan Barat, Pontianak, November 6,1993, p. 10. Soemadi reports that nineteen thousand were 
moved. Soemadi, PKB, p. 177.
101 Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura," p. 2. Headhunting, largely suppressed following a 
1894 Dutch peace-meeting held at Anoi in Central Kalimatan, was revived during Dayak resistance to 
Japanese incursions into West Kalimantan's interior during World War II. From May 1944 until August 
1945, Dayak leaders, including Pang Suma, Pang Solang, and Panglima Burung, staged a series of damaging 
attacks on Japanese troops and installations mainly concentrated in the Tayan-Meliau-Sosok region 
(Sanggau district). See Machrus Effendy, Sejarah Perjuangan Kalimantan Barat (Pontianak: n p., 1982), pp. 
72-95.
102 Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, pp. 267,299.
103 See, for example, the white book by former governor Kadarusno, Pembangunan Daerah Perbatasan 
Kalimantan Barat (Disusun untuk Bahan Diskusi Untan Ilmiah pada Study Club UNTAN, July 1974). 
Detailed reports can be found in Laporan Survey Kehidupan Rakyat Perbatasan, Buku I-IV (Pontianak: 
Kantor Wilayah Departemen Sosial Propinsi Kalimantan Barat, 1976).
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Ideologically, the military proceeded along two tracks. First, it was concerned 
about the lack of formal, state-controlled education among the border populations. 
"The very low level of education," according to the Governor's white book on 
development for the border region, is incapable of "cultivating the consciousness of a 
community steeped in Nation, in Government, and in Pancasila [the state 
ideology]."104 To correct this "deficiency," the military built dozens of schools and 
posted three hundred soldiers as teachers, although a standard curriculum was not 
always taught.105 Dayaks who were unwilling to help the military search for rebels, 
particularly those from Iban communities in the province's eastern reaches, were 
schooled in "social education" programs. Those classified as "serious" underwent 
"mental education programs to induce an opinion change [in English] so as to side with 
[what is] right and to oppose the PGRS-PARAKU enemy."106
Second, the New Order also believed that the lack of established religious belief 
among these populations made them susceptible to communist influence. Dayak 
religions were commonly dismissed as traditional beliefs (kepercayaan). "I don't care 
which religion [they belong to]," one regional commander for West Kalimantan was 
quoted as saying, "as long as they have a religion."107 Dayak community leaders were 
brought to military headquarters in Pontianak, where they were instructed that "The 
PGRS and PARAKU are communists, and communists don't have religion. Dayaks are 
part of the Indonesian nation, which is a religious nation, and Dayaks cannot live 
together with communists. So the PGRS-PARAKU must be crushed."108 To insure 
compliance with state religious policies, the military facilitated missionary work to 
convert the predominantly animist Dayaks. A Catholic Church report admits that their 
work was slow-going in the 1960s, but explains that in the early 1970s "a development 
began under the leadership of ABRI and later under civil authorities which channeled 
this religious movement toward the border area." In the Bengkayang parish, for 
instance, between 1969 and 1975 the church converted 1,400 Dayak, equaling the total 
number of converts during the parish's first thirty-five years. In the nearby Sambas 
parish, twice the number of Dayak were converted during these same six years than 
had been brought into the church from 1913 to 1968.109 Although in absolute numbers 
these conversions started slowly, today the term "Dayak," particularly in West 
Kalimantan's western half, is nearly synonymous with "Christian."
In addition to advocating reforms in Dayak education and religion, the New Order 
also supported economic development as a necessary remedy for both the insurgency
104 Kadarusno, Pembangunatt Daerah Perbatasan Kalimantan Barat, p. 10.
105As late as 1974, troops from Infantry Battalion 123 (North Sumatra) were still teaching at schools in 
border areas. "YTP-123 Rajawali Jadi Guru di Kalbar," Sinar Pagi, October 15,1974.
106 Soemadi, PKB, p. 124.
107 "Agama & Perut," Tempo, October 26,1974.
108 Witono, "Laporan Pang Dam XII/Tandjungpura," p. 3. The original: "PGRS dan PARAKU adalah 
komunis, dan komunis tidak beragama. Orang Dayak adalah termasuk Bangsa Indonesia orang yang 
beragama, karena itu orang-orang Dayak tidak bisa hidup bersama-sama komunis. Jadi PGRS-PARAKU 
harus diganjang."
109 See Huub Boelaars, OFM, and Max Boli Sabon, "Gambaran Umat Katolik Paroki Bengkayang 
Kalimantan Barat" (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Atma Jaya, 1979), p. 29, Table 9, and "Gambaran Umat 
Katolik Paroki Sambas Kalimantan Barat" (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Atma Jaya, 1979), pp. 26,29, Table 9.
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and the "backwardness" of the province and its peoples. Jakarta officials began to 
pour considerable sums of development money into the province, with central 
government subsidies to West Kalimantan increasing from Rp. 550 million in 1969/70 
to Rp. 6.64 billion by 1974/75.110 Locally, this development program was dubbed the 
"Roads and Rice" campaign. The New Order set out to eradicate traditional Dayak 
shifting dry-rice cultivation and to develop wet-rice agricultural systems in the area. 
The development of sawah (irrigated rice fields) would wean the Dayaks from shifting 
cultivation techniques and thus restrict their movement, making these communities 
more governable. But the poor rainforest soil in newly cleared areas was generally 
unable to support intensive wet-rice cultivation, resulting instead in the spread of 
unproductive grasslands. Consequently, the province remained a net-rice importer.111 
The promotion of settled wet-rice agriculture and new trading networks linking the 
border regions to Pontianak (and away from Sarawak) required extensive 
infrastructural improvements, the most important of which was road building.112 It 
was not lost on the military, of course, that an improved road network would facilitate 
counterinsurgency efforts against the PGRS/Paraku and PKI rebels.
While new infrastructure was ostensibly intended to promote economic 
development in the province, it also opened economic opportunities for national and 
military elites alike. With the passage of new foreign and domestic investment laws in 
1967 and 1968, the Jakarta elite actively encouraged the exploitation of Indonesia's 
vast natural resources, and the forests were among the top attractions for domestic as 
well as foreign investors.113 The allocation of forest concessions (HPH, Hak 
Pengusahaan Hutan, Right of Forest Exploitation) took place in Jakarta, commonly 
involving a combination of highly placed bureaucrats and military officers. Military 
engagement in business, however, required partners with capital, local knowledge, and 
managerial skills.
Despite the repeated charges that the PGRS/Paraku and PKI insurgents were 
Chinese, and despite the brutal treatment of the Chinese population in general, it was 
only natural for ABRI to turn to the local ethnic Chinese as business partners. During 
Konfrontasi many ethnic Chinese businessmen had used their good relations with the 
military to obtain state-granted monopolies and export-import licenses. With the 
transition from Konfrontasi to the counterinsurgency campaigns of the late 1960s, local 
Chinese entrepreneurs soon sought new military connections as ardently as New Order 
military officers sought business partners.114 The New Order's first four HPHs in West
110 Pelaksana Evalusi Pelita di Daerah Kalimantan Barat, 1973/1974-1977/1978 (Pontianak, n.p., n.d.), p. 1.
111 See "2,5 juta HA padang alang-alang di Kalbar," Utama, October 31,1973, and Iwan Gayo, ed., Buku 
Pintar Nusantara (Jakarta: Upaya Warga Negara, 1990) p. 649.
112 An Australian company was commissioned to survey the province and build a road network. See 
Government of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, and Snowy Mountains Corporation, Preliminary 
Regional Survey for Road Network Identification in Kalimantan Barat-Indonesia (Canberra: Government of 
Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, December 1973).
113 Nearly one third of the early HPHs in West Kalimantan were joint ventures. "Laporan Gubemur 
Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Barat kepada Wakil Presiden" (dalam rangka kunjungan kerja di 
Kalimantan Barat, 30 Juli s/d Augustus, 1975) (Pontianak, n.p., n.d.), p. 63.
114 One example is Tan Liem Hian, known by the Indonesian name Adijanto. In 1966, Adijanto was briefly 
detained because of his close association with Oevaang Oeray. In 1967, however, Adijanto opened West 
Kalimantan's first crumb rubber mill, with the military's blessing. His Sinar Kapuas company later grew
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Kalimantan were allotted in 1968, and by 1975 twenty-seven HPHs had been granted 
covering roughly 2.5 million hectares of forest.115 Between 1968 and 1973 timber 
production increased a remarkable twenty-five-fold.116 Eager as they were for the easy 
economic rewards of the timber boom, military officers also recognized the intimate 
connection between commercial logging and ongoing counterinsurgency efforts: 
systematic logging operations could (potentially) deprive PGRS/Paraku and PKI 
guerrillas of the cover on which they relied for survival.
But the timber boom in West Kalimantan raised new problems. As the insurgency 
dragged on during the early 1970s, the Indonesian military became convinced that 
Sofyan and the PKI "received support from Chinese timber workers."117 They 
responded by introducing ad hoc labor regulations. In Ketapang, for instance, a ban 
was placed on the employment of laborers from outside the district, presumably to 
prevent communist infiltration and organization among timber workers.118 At the same 
time, the military's Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) 
placed restrictions on the movement of ethnic Chinese labor: Telok Air, the busy timber 
port located ninety-five miles south of Pontianak, was made a "region under 
supervision" (daerah pengawasan), Segedong subdistrict a "closed area" (daerah 
tertutup), and, in the Mempawah area, Chinese timber workers were required to obtain 
work permits from the district military command.119 The forested swamplands of 
Segedong and Mempawah were, of course, one of the last redoubts of Sofyan and the 
PKI between 1972 and 1974.
VII. Migration and Transmigration
As the insurgency dragged on during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the New 
Order came to view West Kalimantan as an ideal receiving area for transmigrants from 
overcrowded Java and Madura. The province's extremely low population density 
(thirteen people/km2 in 1971) and the relocation of tens of thousands of ethnic 
Chinese left large tracts of land open in Sambas and Pontianak districts. During the 
1950s and early 1960s, an Army Transmigration program in West Kalimantan
into the Bumi Raya Utama Group, which in 1990 was Indonesia's eighth largest timber company. Interview, 
Pontianak, June 25, 2000; and "25 Raja Kayu," Warta Ekonomi, April 23,1990, p. 32.
115 Departemen Kehutanan, Data Perkembangan Hak Pengusahaan Hutan (HPH) Sampai Dengan Bulan 
Nopember 1985 Jakarta: Departemen Kehutanan, n.d.). Although on a smaller scale, local military units in 
Kalimantan were also granted forestry rights. For an example from South Kalimantan, see "Kodim Punya 
Idzin Penebangan," Utama, July 10,1973.
116 The total production of logs and sawn timber increased from 127,894 cubic meters in 1968 to 3.2 million 
cubic meters by 1973. Earnings from timber exports rocketed from $2.4 million in 1969/70 to $61.2 million 
in 1973/74. Harlem Siahaan, Golongan Tionghoa Di Kalimantan Barat (Jakarta: Leknas-LIPI, 1974), p. 48, 
Table 5; Laporan Gubernur Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Kalimantan Barat kepada Wakil Presiden Republik 
Indonesia (Pontianak: n.p., 1975), pp. 63-64.
117 Soemadi, PKB, p. 108.
118 "Larang datangkan buruh dari luar," Utama, March 22,1973.
119 //Pekerja2 kayu di Kalimantan Barat dilarang kerja didaerah lain," Utama, March 5,1973. This report 
also mentions that forestry companies were urged to have native (pribumi, i.e. non-Chinese) Indonesians 
comprise at least 50 percent of their work force. Chi military concerns about Telok Air, see "Di Sini Seno 
Hartono," Tempo, August 17,1974.
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facilitated the settlement of revolutionary fighters and former servicemen near the 
Sarawak border and further south in Ketapang, but the numbers remained small. 
Under Suharto's New Order, West Kalimantan was not selected originally as an 
official transmigration site. In early 1973, however, Governor Kadarusno urged the 
central government to make the province an official transmigration destination, hoping 
that an influx of Indonesians (i.e., Javanese) would counterbalance the province's large 
ethnic Chinese population and "civilize" the Dayak groups of the interior.120
New Order authorities responded by opening a number of transmigration sites in 
"strategic" areas. One such area was along the coast, and a number of transmigration 
sites were established outside of Pontianak (at Rasau Jaya and Sungai Kakap) and 
others near Mempawah.121 In the words of one military officer, these transmigration 
schemes were designed to "balance and neutralize Chinese cultural influences and to 
create loyalty toward Indonesia."122 The West Kalimantan-Sarawak border was also 
designated as a strategic area. Jakarta officials hoped that the transmigration 
initiative, in conjunction with the "Roads and Rice" campaign, would create a security 
belt (wilayah aman) along the border. Plans were announced to send nearly 1,300 
military families, termed "transmigrant battalions," to the province each year.123 In 
1971, transmigrants constituted a minute portion of the province's population (0.5 
percent); by 1985 this figure had increased fourteen-fold and has undoubtedly risen 
further since then.124
While state-sponsored transmigration remained limited throughout the 1970s, 
spontaneous migrants continued to enter West Kalimantan, most notably from Java 
and Madura. In contrast to the official Javanese transmigrants placed in selected sites, 
spontaneous migrants not only settled along the coast from Ketapang to Pontianak 
and north to Sambas, but also, and more important, moved inland to occupy land left 
abandoned by the relocation of Chinese, particularly in Sanggau Ledo and Samalantan 
subdistricts.125 "This wild [liar] transmigration," the daily Utama explained in 1973, 
"can create unwanted social problems."126 Although the article does not specify the 
nature of these "social problems," there can be no doubt that it was referring to ethnic 
tensions.127
120 See "Kalbar minta dijadikan daerah Transmigrasi," Utama, February 27,1973.
121 As of 1974,1,584 transmigrants had been moved to Sungai Kakap and 4,227 to Rasau Jaya. Kantor Biro 
Pusat Statistik, Kalimantan Barat Dalam Angka, 1974 (Pontianak: Kantor Biro Pusat Statistik, 1975), p. 16, 
Table 11.12. This same strategy was employed in other "troublesome" provinces, including East Timor, Irian 
Jaya, and Aceh.
122 "Transmigrasi Penting Bagi HAMKAMNAS," Angkatan Bersenjata, August 1,1970.
123 See the editorial "Batalyon Transmigrasi," Angkatan Bersenjata, August 22,1974, and Government of 
Australia, Preliminary Regional Survey, Vol. n, p. 51.
124 Karl Fasbender and Susanne Erbe, Indonesia's Managed Mass Migration: Transmigration between 
Poverty, Economy and Ecology (Flamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv, 1990), p. 137, Table 34.
125 By 1990/91, it was estimated that Madurese made up 7.1 percent of the population in Ketapang district, 
6.4 percent in Pontianak City, and 4.1 percent in Sambas district. Musni Umberan, et al., Peta Suku Bangsa 
Keturunan Cina Di Pesisir Kalimantan Barat (Pontianak: Balai Kajian Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional, 1991).
126 "Menurut Team Komisi VI DPR Penduduk Kalbar 12 pCt WNA Cina," Utama, September 19,1973.
127 On December 7,1967, Madurese homes in a village between Anjungan and Mandor were burned and on 
December 15 fliers circulated outside Pontianak, calling the Madurese "the black Chinese" (tjina hitam) and
80 Jamie S. Davidson and Douglas Kammen
The forced relocation of the ethnic Chinese from the interior and northern border 
areas introduced two new dynamics in West Kalimantan. First, it opened considerable 
agricultural space and opportunities in small-scale trade in the interior. Dayaks 
responded variously. Some showed little interest, while others occupied Chinese land 
(and houses and stores). Of the latter, some were satisfied and remained in their new 
locations permanently; others, frustrated by an inability to produce sufficient yields, 
vacated the land and returned to their villages.128 What is clear is that Javanese and 
Madurese migrants often took advantage of these openings, and the latter soon came 
into conflict with Dayaks.129 Indeed, significant Dayak-Madurese violence in 1967-68, 
1977, 1979, 1983, 1996-97, and 1999 has occurred in precisely the same places where 
the anti-Chinese massacres of 1967 were orchestrated to such brutal effect. Second, the 
relocation of ethnic Chinese created predominately Chinese swathes along the coast 
from Pontianak to Sambas, thus unsettling earlier ethnic relations and overwhelming 
poor coastal Malay fishing communities.
VIII. Military Operations Continued
Meanwhile, military operations continued. Between July 1967 and July 1968, ABRI 
killed at least 397 rebels and captured 209; another 409 surrendered.130 When Operasi 
Sapu Bersih II ended in February 1969, hundreds more had joined this list, and dozens 
more were found dead of starvation in the interior. It is likely that many of these 
individuals were not armed rebels, but rather ethnic Chinese who had refused to leave 
their homes or who had fled further into the forests after the 1967 massacres. 
Nevertheless, a total of 1,096 is greater than many of the early estimates for total rebel 
forces, and this does not take into account the number of rebels killed or captured in 
Sarawak by the Malaysian military, for which data are not available.
But both the PGRS/Paraku and the PKI survived. Rebel relations with Dayak 
communities varied widely. In Pontianak district, good relations between Dayaks and 
Chinese had been shattered, driving many Chinese to join the rebellion. In late 1967,
demanding they leave the area. It is possible that Lasykar Pangsuma (or those associated with the militia) 
instigated these incidents, seizing an opportunity amidst the anti-Chinese violence to evict Madurese as 
well. On December 17, Pak Sani, a Dayak coordinating officer (penghubung) of Sungai Pinyuh (Pontianak 
district) was stabbed to death and his son severely injured. See "Tjina Hitam' Djuga Djadi Sasaran," 
Kompas, December 28,1967. Van Hulten recalls that roughly thirty Madurese were killed by Sangking 
Dayak thereafter. Van Hulten, Hidupku di Antara Suku Daya, p. 296. A recent pro-Dayak account suggests 
that Pak Sani, on his way to Sunday church services, was attacked because he refused to serve a 
Madurese's land-certificate request. Arrestingly, this account fails to mention prior anti-Madurese 
incidents and the possibility of a revenge motive behind Pak Sani's attack. See Edi Petebang and Eri 
Sutrisno, Konflik Etnik di Sambas (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 2000), p. 201.
128 Sources in Sanggau Ledo maintain that many Dayak, although described as being farmers {petani), 
lacked the know-how (ilmu) of cultivation, and that important decisions concerning cultivation were often 
made by the Chinese who owned the land. Various interviews, Sanggau Ledo, July 22-26,2000.
129 Madurese migration intensified in the 1970s but, in actuality, dates back to the mid-to-late ninetenth 
century. Early migrants logged forests, built roads, and worked Chinese-owned rubber plantations. On 
Madurese migration to West Kalimantan, see Hendro Suroyo Sugadung, Mengurai Pertikaian Etnis: Migrasi 
Sivakarsa Etnis Madura ke Kalimantan Barat (Jakarta: ISAI, 2001).
130 See "Tahap Konsolidasi Penumpasan PGRS," Angkatan Bersenjata, July 16,1968. Lower totals are 
reported in "Sejarah Singkat Kodam XIl/Tjpr," Akcaya, July 20,1979.
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the Kompas daily reprinted an extraordinary letter sent by a Chinese man to a Dayak 
village.
Beloved Dayak Brothers!
Our best wishes to you. We hereby ask you a thousand pardons, and we are 
sending you this letter. Over the past centuries we Tiong Hwa and you Dayaks 
have never killed one another.
But today many of us have been killed. Our possessions have been looted and 
our homes burned to the ground. Now even planting for food is still a real mess.
So we are forced to look after our own safety. We hope that you our Dayak 
brothers grant us this today. Don't any longer believe the reactionaries (the lies of 
wicked people).
But if you persist in listening to these reactionary criminals and keep killing us 
and destroying our crops, we will have to take strong action. That's it!
Signed: Sian Sui Kong.131
But in the forested and mountainous interior, the rebels enjoyed close relations with 
Dayaks, living near Dayak settlements and buying food and trading medicine with the 
villagers. In contrast, relationships between the Indonesian military and Dayaks were 
more troubled, for the Indonesian military often forced Dayak villagers to perform 
coolie labor, hauling rice and equipment for little to no pay.132
In March 1969, ABRI initiated Operation Clean Sweep III (Operasi Sapu Bersih III) 
and brought in new army units from Java. Operations were concentrated in the western 
sector, particularly around Bengkayang, around Mount Puah in the northwestern 
comer of the province, Serimbi, and in the Sungkung complex east of Sanggau Ledo, 
where ABRI forces killed the two foremost PGRS/Paraku leaders, Yap Chung Ho and 
Yacob.133 Although the military claimed that these efforts were a success, it was largely 
illusory: PGRS/Paraku and PKI rebels operating in the western sector would flee 
across the border into Sarawak, only to return if attacked by Malaysian troops or 
when Indonesian troops had withdrawn. Under intense attack, Sofyan and his PKI 
forces chose a different route, eventually giving up the guerrilla struggle in the interior 
and taking refuge in proximity to the relocated Chinese population in the Sungai Duri
131 "Surat Jang Bikin Pening Kepala: 'Djangan Lagi Pertjadja [sic] Kaum Reksoinel [sic]'," Kompas, 
December 11,1967. The original reads as follows:
Kepada Sdr2 suku Daya jang Terjinta:
Salam bahagia. Kami disini minta maaf seribu kali, dan kami kirim surat ini untuk sdr2. Kami sama suku 
Daya anda kata [bolehlah dikatakan, red.] sama suku Tiong Hwa dari beberapa ratus tahun yang lalu, tida 
pema bunu berbunu.
Hari ini orang kami suda dibunu banjak. Barang2 dirampok habis, ruma dibakar habis. Sekarang buat 
tanam makanan masi katjau metjanbut. Maka itu kami terpaksa djaga keamanan kami sendiri. Kami harap 
sdr2 suku Daya memberi hari ini. Djangan lagi pertjatja kamu Reksionel (orang djahat punya omong). Djika 
sdr2 masi turns ikut pedjahat kamu reksionel bunu orang kami, merusakkan tanaman kami, harus tindak 
dengan keras! Sekian!
Tanda tangan dari: Sian Sui Kong.
132 Semdam XU, Tanjungpura Berjuang, p. 247. Soemadi discusses the close relations between rebels and 
Dayaks, particularly in the eastern sector. Soemadi, PKB, p. 94. Interviews, Sanggau Ledo, July 22-26,2000.
133 See Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, pp. 327-330.
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region on the coast south of Singkawang.134 If the 1967 massacres and relocations were 
intended to separate the fish from the water, Sofyan and the PKI chose to follow the 
water.
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, reporting on the rebellion fluctuated 
widely. One day newspaper headlines announced that the rebels were virtually 
finished, but on other days they reported that there were hundreds, and on occasion 
even thousands, remaining. The military also used a wide range of names to refer to the 
rebels, suggesting the uncertainty on the part of the military as to the identity of the 
enemy. These included the following:
Indonesian Name
Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Serawak (PGRS) 
Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (Paraku) 
Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Kalimantan Utara
PGRS/Paraku 
PKI
G.30.S/PKI
Komunis Intemasional
Gerombolan Pengatjau Tjina Komunis
Gerombolan Teroris Tjina Komunis 
Gerombolan Tjina Komunis / PGRS 
Gerombolan Komunis PGRS ex PKI 
Pedjoang Kaltara Merdeka 
Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk (OTB)
PKI Gaya Baru 
Gerakan Pengacau Liar
Translation
Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force 
North Kalimantan People's Force 
North Kalimantan People's Guerrilla 
Force
PGRS/Paraku
Indonesian Communist Party 
PKI September 30th Movement 
Communist International 
Chinese Communist Gang of 
Disturbance-Causers 
Chinese Communist Terrorist Gang 
Chinese Communist Gang/PGRS 
Ex PKI now PGRS Communist Gang 
North Kalimantan Freedom Fighters 
Formless Organization 
New Style PKI
Movement of Wild Disturbance- 
Causers
Following Sofyan's flight to the coast sometime in 1969, however, the referents became 
more clearly delineated, with "PGRS/Paraku" clearly referring to rebels from Sarawak 
and "PKI" to Indonesian rebels.
At the same time, military operations along the Kalimantan-Sarawak border 
became more effective. The Indonesian and Malaysian militaries cooperated in their 
pursuit of the insurgents, holding frequent meetings and joint operations. These 
operations were directly supported by Suharto's western allies. The British and 
Australian militaries carried out a photographic aerial survey (while military 
operations were taking place) that resulted in the production of superb topographical
434 See Soemadi, PKB, pp. 173-174. The exact date of Sofyan's flight to the coast is not known, though it 
appears to have been sometime in 1969.
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maps, the military uses of which were all too apparent.135 During this period, the 
Australian government also commissioned an extraordinarily well-researched and 
detailed seven-volume survey, ostensibly for the purpose of building roads in the 
province.136 For its part, the United States was providing Indonesia with both military 
hardware and officer training. With the deaths of Yap Chung Ho and Yacob in the 
western sector, the Indonesian military shifted its focus to the "Paraku" rebels located 
in the eastern part of the province. In 1970, the Indonesian airforce heavily bombed the 
Benua Martinus mountain complex north of Putussibau and then dropped platoons of 
paratroopers to hunt down the rebels.137
Furthermore, the rebellion soon dissipated once an amnesty deal was reached in 
October 1973 between the Sarawak government—represented by Rahman Yakub, 
Sarawak's Chief Minister—and Bong Kee Chok, a top rebel strategist. Having survived 
warfare and innumerable depredations in the mountainous forests of Sarawak and 
West Kalimantan for nearly a decade, some five hundred Malaysian rebels finally gave 
up the struggle, surrendered their weapons, and returned home.138 On the other side of 
the border, the Indonesian government offered no such amnesty and continued to hunt 
down the PKI, whose leader, Sofyan, remained at large.
IX. Hunting Sofyan and the PKI Gaya Baru, 1970-1974
After giving up the guerrilla struggle in the Sanggau Ledo forests, sometime in 1969 
Sofyan fled to the coast, where the ethnic Chinese had been forcibly relocated. Very 
little is known about PKI activity during this period, and most of that information 
derives from highly unreliable military sources. Nevertheless, it is useful to provide a 
sketchy picture drawn from these sources.
Sofyan first set up a training center in Sungai Duri, south of Singkawang, where he 
formally reestablished the PKI, and later moved south to Segedong to recruit more 
members. During the next several years, Sofyan continued to operate in the greater 
Pontianak area. The PKI presence was not limited to Sofyan and his followers, 
however. In his book on communist subversion in West Kalimantan, Gen. Soemadi 
reproduces a detailed chart showing the PKI organizational structure between 1972- 
1974, which lists eighty-five party officials by name and shows eight regional 
committees.139 Throughout this period, the PKI continued to make its presence known.
135 On the mapping, see "65,000 Km2 Daerah Kalbar Dipetakan Oleh Inggris dan Australia," Kompas,
April 4,1970. The relevant map is TPC-L11DG, published by the Director of Military Survey, Ministry of 
Defence, United Kingdom, 1973. This map is remarkable in that it fails to include a number of prominent 
towns but locates rural "clearings" and "dwellings" in great detail.
136 Government of Australia, Preliminary Regional Survey.
137 Semdam XII, Tanjungpura Berjuang, p. 306.
138 Chin Ung-Ho, Chinese Politics in Sarawak: A Study of the Sarawak United People's Party (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 131; M. G. G. Pillai, "Sarawak: Putting trust to the test," Far Eastern 
Economic Review (March 25, 1974): 28-29.
139 The eight regional committees included (1) Pemangkat, Tebas, Sambas and Sekura, (2) Mempawah, 
Pemangkat and Sungai Raya, (3) Mempawah and Pontianak city, (4) Sungai Kakap through Terenteng, (5) 
Pontianak city, (6) Sanggau, (7) Sekadau, and (8) Sintang. The Sintang region is of particular interest 
because Soemadi mentions the existence of a PKI "Kapuas region committee" (comite daerah Kapuas) located
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In May 1972, for example, Sofyan's group distributed pamphlets to celebrate the PKI's 
"birthday," and numerous hammer and sickle flags were mysteriously raised along the 
coastal road from Pontianak to Sambas. In one case, a communist flag was raised in 
the yard of Jawai's subdistrict government office.140
For the West Kalimantan military, the problem was not simply one of armed 
insurgency; they were also concerned about the large ethnic Chinese population now 
concentrated along the coast between Pontianak and Singkawang, which they 
perceived as a potential breeding ground for insurgency. In 1970, the military banned 
the use of Chinese languages over the radio and telephone.141 Despite its insistence 
that there were few rebels left, in August the military announced that there were still 
8,825 former communists in West Kalimantan.142 Apparently the army leadership 
concluded that social control measures—for instance, the ban on spoken Chinese— 
were insufficient to contain the threat. Needing the help of locals to hunt down the 
communists, the military announced cash rewards, with a sliding fee scale for such 
jobs as supplying information and the capture of weapons, culminating with a Rp. 
500,000 reward for Sofyan's capture.143 In July 1973, Brig. Gen. Seno Hartono went so 
far as to appeal to the population to report the whereabouts of "S. A. Sofyan and his 
gang, because they are a thorn in our side."144
In 1973 the military began to employ the infamous "fence of legs" (pagar betis), 
whereby villagers were made to march side-by-side in pursuit of rebels, facing the grim 
prospects of being shot from the front by rebels or, should they refuse this duty, from 
behind by the military. In September this tactic was used in Semperiuk, at the mouth of 
the Sambas River, resulting in the discovery and torching of an alleged "communist 
nest." A month later, the military organized another "fence of legs," this time involving 
one thousand residents in Sungai Raya subdistrict, near Pontianak, resulting in the 
capture of three PKI leaders.145 Continued military operations and foreign assistance 
eventually paid off. In October 1973, ABRI units captured several PKI leaders, 
including Sofyan's wife and seven-month-old baby. Finally, on January 12, 1974, 
Sofyan was captured and promptly executed in the forests of Sungai Kelambu 
(Terenteng subdistrict), roughly fifteen miles upriver from Pontianak.146 Sofyan's death
between Sanggau and Sintang and south to Nangapinoh. Soemadi, PKB, pp. 109,175. Another military 
publication lists three PKI camps with a total of sixty-two rebels in 1970. Pelita 1975, p. 68.
14  ^Interview, Sentebang, Jawai subdistrict, December 9,2000. This source suggests that the decision to 
relocate the Chinese from northern Sambas in 1972 was in response to this resurgence of incidents related 
to the "New-style PKI" (PKI gaya baru).
141 "Warna Warta ABRI," Angkatan Bersenjata, June 22,1970. Another military source notes that a 
regulation was passed "allowing" (ijinkan) ethnic Chinese to use the Indonesian language. Pelita 1975, p. 
68.
142 "8.825 Sisa2 PKI Didaerah Kalbar," Angkatan Bersenjata, August 6, 1970.
143 '"Nalo Kalbar'," Marian Kami, March 26, 1968.
144 "Akan Kikis Habis Gerombolan Komunis P.G.R.K.U," Utama, July 5,1973.
145 For instance, see "Sarang PKI dibumi hanguskan di Semperiuk," Utama, September 5,1973 and "Seribu 
Penduduk Lakukan Operasi Pagar Betis," Utama, October 19,1973.
146 Brigadir Djenderal TNI Seno Hartono, "Laporan Khusus: Pelaksanaan Operasi Penangkapan S.A. 
Sofyan" (Pontianak: Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban Daerah Kalimantan Barat, 
January 14,1974). See also "Sejarah Singkat Kodam XII/Tjpr (5)," Akcaya, July 20,1979. Stories circulate 
that his head was taken to Jakarta for military leaders to see.
Indonesia's Unknown War and the Lineages of Violence 85
marked the end of the ten-year PKI rebellion in West Kalimantan against Suharto's 
rule.
Operations against PGRS/Paraku forces in the eastern sector continued throughout 
the mid-1970s, as did Malaysian operations in the Third Division of Sarawak. Finally, 
in 1976, ABRI formally ended military operations and turned provincial security over 
to Kodam XII/Tanjungpura.147 Nevertheless, there are scattered reports about 
"communists" being arrested in West Kalimantan during the 1980s and about some 
remaining PGRS/Paraku forces still operating in the eastern sector.148
Thus far we have presented an account of the rebellions in West Kalimantan and 
the New Order's response, but intentionally postponed discussion of motivations. It is 
now time to address this fundamental question: why did Sofyan and his followers 
wage a guerrilla struggle against the Suharto regime for nearly ten years against 
overwhelming odds? The most obvious reason was that they fought for their own 
survival. Pogroms had been carried out against the PKI in Java and Bali, and orders 
given for the arrest of PKI members in West Kalimantan. But this is not a satisfactory 
answer. Sofyan and his friends could have fled across the border into Malaysia or 
perhaps to the People's Republic of China and disappeared from history. A second 
possibility is that they fought because they were communists, komunis intermsional, as 
New Order officials repeatedly claimed, who were opposed to military rule, and 
perhaps too because they believed that the PRC and Vietnam would succeed in 
extending communism throughout Southeast Asia. But this explanation too proves 
inadequate: if they were motivated to fight solely by their identification as 
communists, they could have either joined the PGRS/Paraku in the struggle for 
Sarawak or, again, fled to the PRC.
The answer is that Sofyan and his colleagues fought because they were PKI— 
Indonesian communists. Of mixed Arab and Madurese descent and originally from 
Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, Sofyan became chairman of the West Kalimantan PKI 
in 1960. When Sofyan returned to the coast in 1969, he reestablished the PKI. He did 
not establish a Chinese Party of West Kalimantan or a branch of the Chinese 
Communist Party. He was a communist and an Indonesian. In contrast to the fate of 
the PKI members in Java and elsewhere, Sofyan and his comrades survived for so long 
because of the particular features of West Kalimantan. With a vast and heavily 
forested area, a large ethnic Chinese population, a Dayak populace generally resistant 
to interference by a central state, a land border adjacent to Malaysia, and a fellow
147 "Kodam XII Tanjungpura 19 Tahun: Medan-medannya Minta Perhatian Khusus," Kompas, July 18,
1977. The end of military operations did not entail an end to travel and labor restrictions in the province.
148 In 1980, four individuals (all ethnic Chinese) were sentenced for involvement in communist activities.
See Laporan Tahunan Kejaksaan Tinggi Kalimantan Barat Tahun 1980 (Pontianak), p. 71. In 1982, a Chinese 
man accused of belonging to PGRS was arrested in the Lanjak region. Reported in Laporan Tahunan 
Kejaksaan Tinggi Kalimantan Barat Tahun 1982 (Pontianak), p. 110. In 1985-86, Sub-regional Military 
Command 121 (Korem 121) ambushed seven members of what by then was referred to as the "Gerombolan 
Pengacau Liar/Persatuan Gerakan Rakyat Serawak," capturing eight weapons and "communist 
documents." See Laporan Tahunan Kejaksaan Tinggi Kalimantan Barat Tahun 1985/86 (Pontianak), p. 99. 
Furthermore, a 1986 intelligence report maintains that 46 "PGRS/PARAKU" troops were still based in the 
eastern sector in the Tekalan mountains. See the intelligence report: "Laporan: Hasil Rapat Bakorinda Tk-I 
Kalbar," (Pontianak: Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Daerah Kalimantan Barat, July 10,1986), p. 5.
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movement sharing the same border, the West Kalimantan PKI had opportunities 
largely unavailable elsewhere in the archipelago.
Sofyan's execution and the defeat of the PKI in West Kalimantan could not have 
come at a more opportune time for the Suharto regime: a year later Indonesia invaded 
East Timor, initiating more than two decades of brutal military operations and 
occupation in that region. Many of the army units, commissioned officers, and even 
tactics (such as the "fence of legs") originally employed in West Kalimantan were to 
play a major role in East Timor.149 The comparison between these two New Order 
rebellions is instructive. Although the East Timorese resistance was left-leaning during 
the 1970s, by the mid-1980s its Marxist ideology had largely given way to a vague, 
though no less (perhaps even more) potent, ethno-nationalism. This leads one to 
wonder why Sofyan did not shift strategy and declare that he was fighting for an 
independent West Kalimantan. Or did he? Sadly, we know far too little about those 
who fought the Suharto regime.
X. Conclusion
The 1967 massacres, the ten-year "PGRS/Paraku" rebellion, and the succeeding 
ethnic violence in West Kalimantan were neither the result of primordial ethnic 
identities nor traditions of blood-smearing, head-hunting, or cannibalism. Rather, they 
were a product of and remain a reflection on the origins of the New Order and its 
henchmen. Preoccupied with consolidating political control in Java, from 1965 until 
mid-1967 the Suharto regime showed little interest in and even less willingness to 
understand the varied roots of rebellion in West Kalimantan. When it sought to 
address the rebellion, the state did so on the basis of sweeping social categories, 
labeling all "Chinese" as rebels or potential rebels and viewing all others as either 
uninvolved or mere dupes. Finally, in the face of limited state capacity and weak 
legitimacy, the military responded by organizing, instigating, and funding the massacre 
of ethnic Chinese and then forcibly relocated some 100,000 people. In this context, it is 
instructive to quote at length a letter written by a PKI member sometime in late 1967 or 
early 1968:
Even before the blood on their hands [from the 1965-66 massacres] had 
dried, and at the command of their imperialist American masters, [General 
Su]Harto and [Army Chief of Staff] Nasution cruelly set about dividing the 
people's unity and pitting one group against another. This has been done mainly 
by setting the Chinese against other ethnic groups.
These actions are intended to fan a racist anti-Chinese movement. By using 
racism, Harto-Nasution divert the people's attention and anger from the criminal 
and treasonous deeds which they themselves have committed. In so doing, the
149 Officers include: Edi Sudradjat (former ABRI Commander-in-Chief), Faisal Tanjung (former ABRI 
Commander-in-Chief), Hendropriyono (former commander of Kodam Jaya and currently Head of State 
Intelligence), Yunus Yosfiah (former ABRI Chief of the Social and Political Staff, and Minister of 
Information in the Habibie Government), Sintong Panjaitan (former commander of Kodam IX/Udayana; 
sacked because of the 1991 Dili massacre), Sutiyoso (former commander of Kodam Jaya Jakarta and current 
governor of DKI Jakarta), Muchdi PR (former commander of Special Forces), Slamet Supriadi (former 
commander of Kodam IH/Siliwangi, West Java), and many others.
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people's anger is not aimed at Harto-Nasution, but re-directed along ethnic lines, 
and in particular against the Chinese. . . . Consequently, it is the people who 
suffer. Harto and Nasution easily tricked and incited a small group of people 
who, "escorted" [dengan kawal] by their wicked army, are the ones who rob, 
destroy, bum, torture and savagely murder Chinese___150
This history may help to shed light on the persistent outbreak of violence in West 
Kalimantan and the particular forms that this violence has taken. While most accounts 
have portrayed the recent violence in West Kalimantan as an expression of long­
standing ethnic tensions, the very categories "Chinese," "Dayak," "Malay," and 
"Madurese," within which this violence has been waged, were, in large part, created 
and subsequently reinforced by state attempts to address rebellions that the regime 
refused to understand and found itself ill-equipped to confront.
150 "Nampaknja Simpang-siur, Tapi Djelas Polanja," Kompas, January 4,1968. The original reads: "Belum  
lagi tangan mereka kering dengan darah rakjat maka atas perintah tuannja jaitu impoerialis Amerika 
Serikat Harto-Nasution dengan djahatnja mengadu domba dan memetjah belah persatuan didalam suku 
bangsa. Hal ini dimaksudkan terutama adu domba suku Tionghoa dengan suku bangsa lain.
"Tindakan ini tidak lain ditudjukan untuk menyebarkan gerakan rasial anti-Tionghoa. Dengan 
rasialisme ini Harto-Nasution untuk mengalihkan pandangan rakyat dan membelokkan kemarahan rakjat 
terhadap kedjahatan dan penghianatan jang mereka lakukan itu. Dengan demikian kemarahan dan udjung 
tombak rakjat itu tidak ditudjukan pada Harto-Nasution tapi beralih kekesukuan terutama suku 
Tionghoa... Dan akibatnja rakjatlah jang menderita. Dengan menggunakan sekelompok ketjil orang2 jang 
masih dapat ditipu dan dihasut oleh Harto Nasution dan dengan kawal oleh tentara mereka jang djahat 
mereka mengadakan perampokan, perusakan, pembakaran, penganiajaan dan pembunuhan jang biadab 
terhadap orang2 Tionghoa___ "

